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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the factors affecting political support microfinance. Through a 
comparative case study of Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom I provide a new 
approach to understanding microfinance institutions in developed countries. Using Kingdon’s 
three streams approach, combined with Rochefort and Cobb’s contribution on problem 
definition I identify the conditions under which microfinance ensures and sustains political 
support. I find that policy windows are important determinants of political support of 
microfinance. If a policy window is present, microfinance initiatives are more likely to 
receive political support.  In this process I identify four policy windows that have been crucial 
in establishing political support for microfinance. Moreover, I find that the definitions of the 
various problems and target groups that microfinance is supposed to address influences 
political support. Finally I identify five dominant problem definitions and show how they 
have affected political support for microfinance initiatives in the three cases. 
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1 Introduction 
Since its beginnings in the late 1970s microfinance has emerged as a tool to fight poverty and 
exclusion in the developing world (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 242). Over the last few decades, 
however, microfinance has also gained increasing attention in developed countries as well, 
and today we see microfinance used as a means to combat unemployment and social 
exclusion across Europe. The various implementations are diverse in nature from small 
microfinance institutions serving poor neighbourhoods to large government-run programs 
(see e.g. Evers, Lahn, & Jung, 2007).  
Moreover, the experience with microfinance across Europe is as diverse as the 
implementations of the idea, and whereas some countries have had relatively successful 
microfinance interventions, others have struggled to survive. The puzzle is therefore to 
discover why some microfinance initiatives succeed while others fail.  
As it turns out, the conditions for microfinance to succeed differ considerably between 
developing and developed countries. The cushioning effect of the welfare state as well as the 
competing effect of well-structured market economies of developed countries creates new and 
different challenges for microfinance initiatives. The chief of these is the challenge to achieve 
sustainability, and in most European countries microfinance initiatives have been partially or 
wholly dependent on public support for survival (Evers et al., 2007, p. 23). 
This provides the entry point for my thesis. If microfinance is dependent on public support, 
the question of success and failure changes from only dealing with profitability, sustainability, 
and the merits of different approaches to microfinance, into one that also deals with 
explaining political support. Using Harold Laswell’s famous phrase, politics revolves around 
the questions of “who gets what, when, and how.” I am therefore interested in investigating 
the political factors that influence support for microfinance initiatives. This brings me to my 
research question: 
Which factors can explain the differences in political support between microfinance 
initiatives across developed countries in general, and between Norway, Sweden, and 
the UK in particular? 
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Using this research question as a point of departure I will do a comparative case study of the 
microfinance experiences in Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These three cases 
represent three different stories of how political support has influenced microfinance 
initiatives. UK represents a case where the microfinance approach has seen widespread 
adoption. Norway and Sweden on the other hand has seen more mixed results, despite some 
important differences.  
Two questions shave guided my research. First, how did the political support for microfinance 
initiatives come about in the first place? Second, why was there policy support for 
microfinance initiatives?  In order to answer the first question I have used John Kingdon’s 
(2014) three streams approach with a particular focus on the emergence of so-called policy 
windows as a factor influencing political support. In order to answer the second question I 
have used Rochefort and Cobb’s (1993) problem definition approach, where I try to identify 
the various definitions of policy problems, target groups, and solutions and how they have 
influenced political support for microfinance. 
I find that policy windows are important determinants of political support of microfinance. If 
a policy window is present, microfinance initiatives are more likely to receive political 
support.  In this process I identify four policy windows that have been crucial in establishing 
political support for microfinance. Moreover, I find that the definitions of the various 
problems and target groups that microfinance is supposed to address influences political 
support for microfinance. Other, smaller findings will be discussed throughout the thesis. 
Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two provides a historical backdrop for microfinance. I discuss its roots and spread 
from developing to developed countries. Next I discuss the role of the European Union as a 
key promoter of microfinance. Finally I provide a short historical introduction to 
microfinance in the three selected countries 
Chapter three presents a review of the literature on microfinance. I discuss some of the key 
issues, such as the performance of microfinance as a tool to address poverty and exclusion. I 
also discuss the issue of microfinance sustainability before I turn to some of the 
methodological issues that is facing the field. I end with a discussion of the limitation of the 
literature and provide a rationale for choosing the subject as a thesis topic. 
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Chapter four discusses the theoretical foundations of microfinance. I talk about the problems 
of adverse selection, moral hazard and transaction costs, and discuss their relevance in 
developing as well as in developed countries. I then move to the topic of the social economy 
and social entrepreneurship as a means to situate microfinance in a European context. Finally 
I present the two theories of public policy that have guided my thesis and discuss their 
relevance to understanding microfinance. 
Chapter five deals with the research design. First I attempt to spell out how I will use the 
theoretical perspectives to analyse the case, and present a model illustrating the theoretical 
expectations. I then proceed to discuss the methodical aspects of my design. I discuss the 
nature of the research, case selection, as well as data collection and analysing methods. 
Throughout the section I discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the design. 
Chapter six presents the analysis. First, I revisit the issue of political support for 
microfinance. I subsequently move on to my two explanations, presenting first the policy 
window variable, then the problem definition variable. Each variable includes a separate 
discussion of the three cases and a summary of the general tendencies. I finally conclude with 
a summary of all the findings. 
Chapter seven presents the conclusion and implications of the analysis. I attempt to take a 
step back draw some lines between the different explanations before I say a few words of the 
implications of the findings. 
Some definitions 
Clarification of some key terms is due. Microfinance is a term with several meanings. For 
example, microfinance and microcredit are technically two different terms, with the former 
technically including additional financial services such as insurance. I will nevertheless stick 
to the conventional practice of using microfinance as synonymous with microcredit. 
Moreover, while the EU defines it as SME loans less than €25,000, other definitions operate 
with a much lower ceiling. What is appropriately called microfinance differs considerably 
when taking price levels of the various countries into account. I have therefore chosen a more 
general definition that captures all types of microfinance: small business loans generally given 
to low-income people, not requiring collateral. Note that this definition excludes personal 
lending. Finally names differ across countries: in Norway microfinance goes by the name 
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‘Networked credit.’ In Sweden and the United Kingdom it is called ‘micro loans/credit.’ 
Unless otherwise specified I will nevertheless use the term microfinance.  
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) refers to an institution engaging in microfinance. In the 
UK, MFIs are called Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs), which also 
includes credit unions and community loan funds. This creates some potential for confusion, 
but since the norm in the data has been to refer to MFIs as CDFIs, disaggregation is not 
possible. Microfinance initiatives refer to the whole process where microfinance has been 
adopted in a specific context rather to a specific actor. For example, the collaboration between 
MFN-Cultura is a microfinance initiative. 
Political Support refers to support for microfinance from politicians, policy makers, public 
servants. I use the term political support in a relatively broad sense. Rather than simply 
referring to support from politicians, I also include support from state-run institutions and the 
bureaucracy. The reason for this is that policy attention to microfinance does not always come 
from politicians, which are often concerned with bigger and more pressing issues. Discretion 
is customarily given to the various agencies that actually deal with microfinance on a regular 
basis. 
Table 1.1: List of abbreviations 
CDFI Community development financial institution 
CNRI Credit Network for Refugees and Immigrants 
IN Innovation Norway 
MFI Microfinance institution 
MFN Microfinance Norway 
MLGRD Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 
NIRDF Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund 
RDA Regional Development Agencies 
ROSCA Rotating savings and credit association 
SAERG Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
SME Small and medium enterprise 
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2 Historical Background 
This chapter presents an overview of the historical development of microfinance. I start by 
tracing its roots from the subsidised credit schemes that existed prior to microfinance in the 
developing world. Subsequently I present a brief introduction to microfinance and how it 
functions, before I look at its spread throughout the developing world as well as its 
introduction to Europe. Finally, I present a brief historical overview of microfinance in 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
2.1 Microfinance in the developing world 
The origins: subsidised credit 
Credit is a key component in addressing poverty. With just enough money to get by, most of 
poor people’s income is directed towards consumption rather than saving. With little or no 
savings, a poor person can not invest to expand economic activity thereby increasing his 
income beyond subsistence levels (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 241). The solution to this 
problem is to borrow. In developing countries, however, capital is relatively scarce and 
therefore costly. Financial markets are usually underdeveloped, and the reach of banks is 
limited to the larger cities. Moreover, the poor can not provide the necessary assurance or 
collateral needed for banks to reduce their risk. Still, shops need to stock up on inventories; 
farmers need to buy seeds and fertilizer for the next crop cycle; and seasonal workers need 
money for consumption outside of the harvesting season (see Ray, 1998, pp. 531–2). 
If commercial banks are unable to serve large parts of the population, credit must come from 
elsewhere. The poor are therefore often forced to turn to the informal sector. The informal 
sector has –and continues to play– a major role in the provision of credit in developing 
countries. One study from Thailand showed that in 1975 informal lending accounted for 90% 
of total rural credit (Ray, 1998, p. 536). The informal sector is nevertheless far from an ideal 
option for the poor.  On the one hand, informal lenders are often willing to accept alternative 
forms of collateral, such as labour, or produce. Moreover, their proximity to the local 
community might give them informational advantages that lower risk (Ray, 1998, p. 536). On 
the other hand, informal lenders can also claim excessive amounts of collateral or charge 
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usurious rates of interest. Not only does this further increase the cost of capital for the poor, it 
has the potential trapping them in perpetual cycles of over-indebtedness and poverty. 
To curb the spread of informal credit markets, developing countries have therefore since the 
end of the Second World War focused on how to provide viable alternatives to informal credit 
markets. One common method for supplying capital for development purposes has been 
through development banks. Development banks are large government-owned banks that 
supply large amounts of long-term low-interest capital to finance development projects. These 
banks do not merely supply capital; they also engage in entrepreneurial, managerial, and 
promotional activities (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 751). They have, however, also typically 
restricted their involvement to strategic large-scale projects of national interest, such as 
government-led infrastructure development; import-substituting industrial conglomerates; and 
public health measures. Consequently, projects on a smaller scale, such as non-industrial 
farming or shop keeping, have been considered outside the purview of the development 
banks. Large parts of the population therefore falls outside the scope of development banks: 
they lack strategic importance, and are too costly relative to return to invest in (Todaro & 
Smith, 2006, p. 751). This is not without consequence, as between 40-70% of people in 
developing countries are employed in small-scale production and enterprise.  
A popular solution to reach this large group of excluded poor has been through various forms 
of subsidised credit. Prior to the proliferation of microfinance, this was the most common 
approach used by developing countries to address financial exclusion. Especially within the 
agricultural sector, credit was abundantly provided in attempts to finance adoption of new 
technology and machinery (Von Pischke, Adams, & Donald, 1983, p. 2). By the 1970s 
virtually all developing countries had programs of subsidised credit. Cheap credit would be 
supplied by the state and lent out through agricultural banks or local intermediaries such as 
millers and local landowners. Sometimes the same actors as in the informal market were even 
used. The subsidisation, however, meant that little or no collateral were imposed, and that the 
interest rates were kept artificially low, making this form of credit a low-cost alternative to the 
moneylenders’ own loans.  
Nevertheless, this approach had considerable drawbacks. Adams et. al. (1984, p. 3) argue that 
a flawed view of credit as a policy tool were among the reasons for this was. Authorities 
tended to regard credit as merely an input alongside other inputs such as capital and labour, 
implying a relatively direct causal relationship between money supplied and output produced 
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existed. Consequently governments were generous in their provision of cheap credit, and 
conversely lax in their efforts to recover the loans. This view, however, fails to consider the 
complex and dynamic role of credit as an instrument of financial intermediation, which can 
affect behaviour and alter incentives in powerful ways. These incentive-altering mechanisms 
were precisely what caused the problems of the subsidised programs. 
Moreover, losses were tolerated because of the social and developmental focus of the 
programs. Soft-constrained loans meant that the authorities did not expect full repayment, and 
struggling banks were instead simply propped up by the state. This created a problem of 
moral hazard that made people even more reluctant to default, especially since everyone else 
defaulted. As governments customarily recapitalised those banks that were engaged in 
subsidised lending, banks and other intermediaries had little incentive to bring down the 
number of defaults (Morduch, 2000, p. 620). Finally, the programs tended to encourage 
manipulation and cronyism, favouring of friends and associates of policymakers. Large-scale 
producers, rather than the poor farmers the programs were intended for, were often able to 
position themselves favourably and thus receive the bulk of the credit (Vogel & Larson, 1984, 
p. 57). Loans would often be awarded to the well-connected middle– and upper class, rather 
than to the poor who needed them. 
Microfinance as a solution 
In the 1970s, microfinance emerged as a novel approach to the problem of financial exclusion 
of the poor. While there is no universal definition of microcredit, it can best be described as 
small loans, usually given to poor that lack collateral and access to conventional credit. It is 
difficult to pinpoint the exact origin of microfinance. The earliest known account was the 
Irish Loan Fund, set up in 1720 by the Irish pastor and writer Jonathan Swift in order to 
provide loans with no collateral to the poor of Dublin. Another initiative was the Indonesian 
Priyayi Bank for microloans, set up in 1895 (Srinivas, n.d.). Yet another example of 
microfinance can be found in the so-called Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs). ROSCAs, who have a long history of use throughout world, are informal groups 
coming together and pooling their resources, which they subsequently lend out on a rotating 
basis within the group (Bouman, 1983, p. 262). The group element of the ROSCAs were an 
important inspiration for the model we commonly associate with microfinance today, namely 
the Grameen model.  
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The Grameen bank (meaning ‘bank of the villages’) was born out of a 1976 research project 
by Mohammed Yunus, professor of Economics at the Chittagong University, Bangladesh. 
Yunus argued that access to credit was the main obstacle for development, and through 
collaboration with the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Bank he started supplying cheap 
credit to the poor (Todaro & Smith, 2006, p. 242). Since the late 1970s, the Grameen 
approach to microfinance has been in the forefront in driving the ‘microfinance revolution.’ 
Like ROSCAs, the Grameen model attempted to mitigate the problems of information and 
lack of collateral. It revolved around group loans with joint liability for the group as a whole. 
Groups of five – initially both men and women, later only women – were given small sums of 
money that were lent out and repaid within the group on a rotating basis. With Grameen, 
however, this was systematised on a large scale. 
Microfinance spreads beyond Grameen 
The Grameen project proved a big success. It was formally chartered as a bank in 1983 and 
has since grown tremendously, counting over 8 million borrowers and 2,500 branch offices, 
each covering 15-20 villages in rural Bangladesh (“Grameen Bank | Bank for the poor - GB 
At a Glance,” 2011). Over the next decades, this success spurred a flood of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), notably in other developing countries. The scale and scope of these 
adoptions have been diverse. One the one hand there are small, specialised banks employing 
just a few people and focusing exclusively on loans. On the other hand there are gigantic 
organisations such as BRAC, which reaches 130 million poor, employs over 100,000 people 
in eleven countries across three continents, and engages in a wide range of projects including 
education, public health, and social development. Here microfinance represents only a small 
part of the total service delivered (“Stay Informed: BRAC at a Glance,” 2013). Combined 
microfinance is now reaching a significant part of the world’s poor across all five continents. 
In 2007, the UN estimated that roughly 154 million people were users of microcredit across 
the globe (Width, 2010, p. 15).  
The proliferation of microfinance has not been without controversies, and criticisms of 
microfinance have been levied at various times over the last few decades. Questions have 
been raised of whether the Grameen model merely perpetuates cycles of dependence.1 
Moreover, with the spread of the model new providers are entering the market, some with 
                                                
1 See chapter 3 on microfinance impact for a detailed discussion on efficacy. 
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little regard for the original humanitarian ideal of microfinance. In 2010 it was reported that 
more than 77 people in the Indian province of Andhra Pradesh had been driven to suicide as a 
result of MFIs charging excessive interest rates, adopting coercive collection practices and 
engaging predatory lending towards the poorest borrowers (Ghiyazuddin & Gupta, 2012, p. 
4). Despite of the uncertainties and controversies the growth of microfinance is impressive, 
and it has quickly become a considerable part of the effort to promote development across the 
globe, favoured both by Western donors and developing countries themselves. 
2.2 Microfinance in Europe 
Although microfinance was initially conceived of as a tool for poor rural developing countries 
such as Bangladesh and India, this has not prevented the spread of the approach to more 
developed countries. European countries in particular were early adopters of microcredit, with 
many initiatives emerging during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Eastern Europe the driver 
of this development was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which left in its wake 
crippled, dysfunctional states and millions of unemployed. The shortage of capital was severe, 
but decades of command economy meant that the former Soviet republics simply had no 
financial markets. Considerable effort were therefore undertaken to support the reintegration 
of these economies into the European economy, and microfinance was a key part of this effort 
(Forster, Greene, & Justyna Ptykowska, 2003, p. 14). 
Microfinance was also introduced among the affluent countries in Western Europe. Although 
developing countries might be at a particular disadvantage in providing finance to its poor, 
exclusion from financial markets are certainly not limited to these countries. A 2006 report by 
World Savings Banks Institute estimated that about 10% of the European population is 
financially excluded, that is, are unable to access conventional sources of credit (McDowell, 
2006, p. 7). Women, visible minorities, the unemployed, immigrant populations, and other 
disadvantaged groups often face the same kind of exclusion from access to finance in rich 
Western countries as in poor developing ones, and lack of collateral as well as problems 
associated with proving creditworthiness are typical and relevant challenges in developed 
economies as well (see e.g. Rogaly, Fisher, & Mayo, 1999). The last twenty years has 
therefore seen microfinance initiatives emerging in new contexts, from poor African-
American urban communities in the United States, to immigrant population inside the 
European Union, and in remote fishing villages in rural Norway. 
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In many ways the early European development of microcredit were built upon the same 
experience as that of the developing countries. Preceding the introduction of microfinance 
were subsidised loan funds, set up by regions and countries to combat increasing 
unemployment and social exclusions. Examples of these include Fonds de Participation in 
Belgium and First Step in Ireland (Evers et al., 2007, p. 11). But like in developing countries 
these funds struggled to recover their capital and were plagued by high rates of default.  
As the success of microfinance in developing countries became widely known, there were 
initiatives undertaken across Western Europe to import the model. Today a number of 
organisations are engaging in microfinance in Europe, such as ADIE in France, KfW in 
Germany, and La Caixa in Spain. The tables below, which are taken from the European 
Microfinance Network sector overview for 2011, show the size of the sector in the respective 
European countries in terms of clients and loan value2. We see that while large countries such 
as France and Spain figure high up on the list, Eastern European countries also show a strong 
level of microfinance activity. The cases selected for this thesis, on the other hand, seem to 
have much lower level of activity. 
 
                                                
2 Note that these figures also include personal microfinance in addition to business microfinance. These figures 
only survey EU members, and do not include Norway. 
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Figure 2.1: Total number of loans disbursed (business and person microloans). Taken directly from EMN (2011) 
 
Figure 2.2: Total value of loans disbursed (business and person microloans) Taken directly from EMN (2011). 
The first European MFIs were idealist organisations: they were founded by people who had 
personally seen the success of microfinance in developing countries, and who sought to 
import it to their home countries. Some of the largest MFIs today, such as the mentioned 
ADIE in France, as well as Enigma in Germany to name a few, were created this way (Evers 
et al., 2007, p. 11). These pioneers were followed by a host of small and large organisations, 
and the years after 2000 saw rapid growth in the number of MFIs. This period also saw 
ordinary banks entering the field of microfinance through collaborations with MFIs, with 
MFIs taking responsibility for client relations and business development services, and banks 
taking responsibility for providing capital and loan handling (McDowell, 2006, p. 7) The 
collaboration between the Norwegian Cultura Bank and the MFI Microfinance Norway 
(MFN) between 2008 and 2012 is such an example. 
While established in Europe today microfinance plays a considerably smaller role within the 
European economy compared to its role in developing economies, and the size of 
microfinance market relative to the conventional bank market is still miniscule: adding the 
value of loans in Figure 2 gives a total of less than €1 billion. Moreover, the market for 
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microfinance itself is also shared between only a few actors: data from 2007 shows that 
within the European Union three MFIs – Adie in France, Finnvera in Finland, and Fundusz 
Mikro in Poland– accounted for 70% of all loans given (McDowell, 2006, p. 23). It is 
important to keep this in mind when looking at the potential that microfinance has as a 
measure for financial and social inclusion. Its role is not to compete with or supplant 
conventional markets: a successful microfinance story usually ends when that person gets a 
loan in a conventional bank. 
Microfinance and the European Union 
Throughout the 1990s microcredit was something mostly undertaken by grass roots idealists 
and private organisations, usually with funding from various state agencies. Around the turn 
of the century, however, the promise of microfinance had also caught the attention of the 
European Union. Over the course of the decade a number of projects were launched: Between 
1996 and 2001 the ‘Equal Credit Project,’ funded by the European Regional Development 
Fund, explored the use of microcredit to support development among rural and urban 
deprived groups, such as immigrant communities (Sekkesæter, 2002, p. 6). In 2000 the 
European Commission adopted the ‘European Multilateral Programme (MAP) for Enterprise 
and Entrepreneurship, in particular SMEs3 (2000-2005).’ This program was the first time 
microcredit was recognised as a tool in the European Union’s effort to support 
entrepreneurship and small– and medium enterprises (European Commission, 2003, p. 5). All 
these programs thus provided test beds for the various applications of microcredit to foster 
financial inclusion. They also marked the first attempts to formally institutionalise microcredit 
at the EU level. 
After 2007 the EU moved to consolidate these various projects into an over-arching 
framework for microfinance. Today, therefore, microcredit and microfinance have become 
considerable parts of the Union’s strategy for inclusion, sustainability, and social cohesion. 
Several programs were launched, aiming to provide either financial or technical assistance. 
These programs are summarised in the table below. With this consolidation of programs funds 
available has been substantially increased. For example, under the current financing window 
of Progress Microfinance €205 million has been provided for the period 2010-2016 
(“European Progress Microfinance Facility,” n.d.). 
                                                
3 Small and Medium Enterprises 
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Table 2.1: EU programs supporting microfinance 
Name of Programme Focus of Programme 
EQUAL programme (2000-2008) Focused on equal access to the labour markets, 
and included microcredit as a tool to encourage 
inclusive entrepreneurship. 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme 
(CIP) (2007-2013) 
Tasked with boosting the entrepreneurial 
initiative and creating a productive environment 
where innovation capacity can grow and 
develop. 
Joint European Resources to Micro to medium-
sized Enterprises  (JEREMIE) (2007-2013) 
offered EU Member States the opportunity to 
use part of their EU Structural Funds to finance 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by 
means of equity, loans or guarantees. 
Joint Action to Support Microfinance in Europe 
(JASMINE) (2007-2013) 
Provided European MFIs with training and 
technical assistance, such as quality 
assessments and ratings of their businesses 
activities similar to conventional rating services 
provided to conventional banks. 
Progress Microfinance (2010-2016) Provides funds for intermediary MFIs, channels 
these funds as microloans for the unemployed, 
microentrepreneurs, and others who are 
excluded from traditional channels of finance. 
Moreover, the program provides guarantee 
funds that MFIs can tap into in order to support 
their lending activities. 
 
One can therefore claim that EU has been one of the main drivers of the development of 
microfinance initiatives in Europe. Because of its financial resources and willingness to fund 
projects that are often too experimental for domestic governments EU has acted as an enabler 
of microfinance. This becomes clearer as we progress into the empirical analysis. Today, the 
EU continues as the main driver of microfinance in Europe. 
2.3 Microfinance in the three cases – an overview 
Microfinance in Norway 
The first attempt of implementing microfinance to Norway was in 1992, in the coastal region 
of Lofoten. This rural region in the north of Norway is highly dependent on the fisheries 
outside of the coast and the income derived from the processing and export of fish. Fishing, 
however, is a seasonal activity, which leaves the population vulnerable outside of the season, 
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with little income to support other income-generating activities. The fluctuating income and 
lack of collateral also made it difficult to gain access to credit. A three year pilot project 
incorporating the municipalities of Flakstad and Moskenes and based on the Grameen model 
was therefore launched to test out the potential of microfinance to encourage self-employment 
out of season (Lotherington & Ellingsen, 2002, p. 18). 
The goal of the project was threefold: In addition to providing finance, microcredit was to act 
as an arena tool for sharing of experiences and ideas, and as a unifying force for various 
grassroots activities in the community. Finally, microcredit had a gender aspect. Because of 
typical house ownership patterns, women would often be the ones that lacked access to 
collateral. Moreover, it was often women who had to leave out of season. Microcredit would 
be specifically used as a tool to empower women, both through providing access to credit, as 
well as through providing a forum for sharing of experiences and ideas (Lotherington & 
Ellingsen, 2002, p. 18).  
The Lofoten pilot attracted considerable public and official attention, and in the subsequent 
years a number of additional groups were initiated. During the first years the focus was on 
women, particularly in rural districts in the northern parts of Norway that are dependent on 
fishing or farming. One project, for example, targeted indigenous Sami women in the 
municipality of Karasjok (Bjørnholt, 1995, p. 127). Soon, however, there were attempts to 
adopt the model to urban settings as well. In 1996 the Credit Network for Refugees and 
Immigrants (CNRI) was created and funded by the humanitarian organisation Norwegian 
People’s Aid. The rationale for the initiative was the fact that immigrants and refugees were 
excluded from the formal economy instead withering away at asylum centers. Microcredit 
specifically targeted towards immigrant and refugee populations had been a part of ADIE’s 
successful approach in France, but this was the first initiative where it was used to fight 
financial exclusion among these groups in Norway. The same year, the first attempt at 
consolidating the various groups was also undertaken, when the Women’s Bank 
(Kvinnebanken Norgesnett) was founded to act as an umbrella organisation for the emerging 
microcredit initiatives.  
The Ministry of Fisheries had already had an active role financing the pilot projects, but soon 
other official bodies started exploring the potential of microcredit. In 1997, the government 
presented a White Paper outlining microcredit as a future focus area for the Norwegian 
Industrial and Regional Development Fund (NIRDF) (Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 
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1997). NOK 10 million was earmarked for microcredit initiatives. Hereafter NIRDF, and 
from 2003 its successor Innovation Norway (IN), would be the primary source of government 
funding and oversight of microcredit initiatives in Norway. This marks the first official 
recognition of microcredit as a policy tool in fostering entrepreneurship in Norway. It also 
marked the start of a schism in the Norwegian microfinance development. Rather than 
receiving financing from NIRDF/IN, CNRI was sustained independently from the “official” 
microcredit program. Along with domestic sources of financing, CNRI was a part of the 
EQUAL Community Initiative mentioned above, which provided funds and guarantee 
instruments. (Sekkesæter, 2002, p. 6)  
In 2003 the CNRI project was wound up and Norwegian People’s Aid disengaged from its 
involvement. Network Credit Norway (NCN, later Microfinance Norway) was subsequently 
founded as the project’s successor building on the experience from CNRI. In 2003, NCN in 
collaboration with Hordaland county municipality and Cultura Bank, created the Microinvest 
Foundation, a fund dedicated to financing microcredit initiatives. Hordaland county 
municipality would along with other supporters of the project such as the Norwegian 
Directorate for Immigration provided financing, Cultura acted as the financial intermediary 
and managed the operational activities of the fund, while the NCN coordinated lending 
activities and provided business training and support (Wiggen, 2005, pp. 71–75). With the 
end of the EQUAL Community Initiative in 2003, financing and guarantee responsibilities 
were taken over by the European Investment Fund under the EU MAP programme, and 
subsequently the CIP programme 2006 (Hektoen, 2011, p. 176). 
By the mid-2000s microcredit appeared to be an established, albeit small niche in Norway. 
Innovation Norway administered a total of 265 groups with over 1320 members, with a total 
equity of NOK 53 million (Width, 2010, p. 17). Moreover, NCN and Cultura had throughout 
the 2000s made loans to about 173 of its members, totalling NOK 5,5 million (Interview 
MFN 27:00). In 2008, a White Paper on women’s entrepreneurship advocated strengthening 
the initiative, promising an additional NOK 10 million towards microcredit activities provided 
through (Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet, 2008, p. 26). 
Then, however, Norwegian microcredit suddenly collapsed. First, Innovation Norway 
suspended their microcredit activities in favour of so-called “Entrepreneur Groups” 
(Gründergrupper in Norwegian) (Innovasjon Norge, 2009, p. 40). Three years later, Cultura – 
citing poor performance and low profitability of their microcredit portfolio – followed suit, 
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and disinvested from their partnership with NCN. During the years 2006-2009 there had been 
a large increase in activity on the lending side, but between 2009-2012 Cultura did not make a 
any new loans (Interview MFN 19:10). While MCN and the guarantee fund Microinvest still 
exists, there is still no capacity to act as an independent MFI without a financial intermediary. 
Microfinance in Sweden 
The first attempt introducing microfinance in Sweden was the project “Nättverksbanken i 
Dalarna,” which translates into “The Network Bank in the Dalarna region.” The project was 
financed by a combination of local- and EU funds. A key inspiration for the project was in 
fact the Norwegian Lofoten pilot created a few years earlier (“Nätverksbanken i Dalarna,” 
2014). This project was followed by several other similar projects, such as “Nätverksbanken i 
Falun” and “Nätverksbanken i Jämtland.” The focus of all of these projects was similar to that 
in Norway. These rural regions all struggled with patterns of depopulation that was affecting 
women in particular. Thus microfinance was seen as a method to foster network building, 
community development, and entrepreneurship among women. 
The first introduction of microfinance in government policy came somewhat later than in 
Norway. In 2001, the Swedish government decided to create a so-called “micro loan,” 
supplied through the business incubator service ALMI, the Swedish equivalent to the 
Norwegian Innovation Norway (Regeringen, 2001, p. 173). After a few years the loan was 
finally launched in 2005 under the term “miniloans.” Like in Norway, the introduction of an 
“official” loan led to a schism emerging between the publicly supported microfinance 
initiative and the grassroots initiatives, and whereas the official initiative received sustained 
funding, the private initiatives had to struggle to stay afloat. 
2004 marked the start of a “second wave” of grassroots initiatives. That year the  “Swedish 
Platform for Microcredit” was started by various grassroots organisations, inspired by the 
UN’s decision to make 2005 the international microcredit year (“Nyhetsbrev Nr 04 - mars 
2005,” 2005). Over the next few years a number of microfinance initiatives were launched 
across Sweden, usually with a combination of local and EU funding from programs such as 
EQUAL. These initiatives shared the same focus on the grassroots aspect of microfinance and 
had an explicit focus on groups facing difficulties in accessing finance from conventional 
sources, such as women and immigrants. 
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In 2008 ALMI decided to improve the conditions on the mini loan. With the financial crisis 
hitting the European economy the credit conditions worsened, and many entrepreneurs and 
small business owners found themselves lacking access to capital. First, the ceiling from the 
loan more than doubled to SEK 250,000; second, the requirement for collateral or guarantors 
was removed. This made the loan into a more “true” micro loan, reflected in the rebranding of 
the loan as precisely a “micro loan.” 
Today ALMI’s micro loan continues to be a popular measure with a consistent level of 
demand over the last few years. In 2014, ALMI as the first Swedish institution entered the 
PROGRESS microfinance program of the EU, allowing it to sustain and expand its 
microfinance initiatives over the coming years (“European Progress Microfinance Facility,” 
n.d.). The grassroots alternatives, however, have struggled. Most of the pilots have yielded no 
further results at the conclusion of the project period. The one exception, the MFI 
Mikrofinansinstitutet was launched in 2011. The MFI was born out of the PITEM I an II 
pilots that ran between 2004 and 2007, and offered microfinance services including loans and 
business development services. This was the first fully-fledged MFI of its kind in Sweden. 
Nevertheless, by 2014 MFI’s activity had subsided. There are currently no grassroots 
initiatives promoting microfinance in Sweden.  
Microfinance in the United Kingdom 
The UK has a long history of cooperative movements and credit unions, but like in Norway 
and Sweden microfinance initiatives on a larger scale only emerged towards the end of the 
1990s. Small MFIs, such as the Norwich Full Circle Fund, existed as far back as the late 
1980s, but these were small and scattered. It was the election of Tony Blair and New Labour 
in 1997 that propelled microfinance into the national spotlight. One of Blair’s chief promises 
was to address the growing class divisions and income inequalities that had emerged in the 
UK under the Conservative rule over the last decades. One of his first tasks was to create the 
Social Exclusion Unit to deal with these issues. With the 1998 launch of SEU’s ambitious 
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, so-called Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs) became part and parcel of the government’s effort to address community 
deprivation poverty (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). CDFIs encompassed microfinance 
institutions, credit unions, and community loan funds dedicated to improving access to 
finance among the financially excluded. 
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Over the next decade the government launched a host of measures in order to support the 
emerging CDFI sector, such as the Phoenix Development Fund, Regional Development 
Agencies, the Social Exclusion Task Force, and the Office of the Third Sector. Unlike 
Norway and Sweden, the government took a more passive role in terms of providing financial 
assistance. Institutions such as the Social Exclusion Task Force worked on policy 
development, while funds a such as the Phoenix Fund, provided wholesale capital for on-
lending, that is, for CDFIs to provide further to their own clients. Around these measures 
therefore, a new sector of CDFIs emerged, rather than the divided development that occurred 
in the two other countries. Towards the end of the decade, however, some of the earlier 
enthusiasm had subsided. Policymakers had turned their attention elsewhere, and after the 
Phoenix Fund closed down in 2005, maintaining funding had become a challenge for many 
CDFIs, as the degree self-sustainability amongst them was generally low.  
Around the 2010 general election the situation had once again turned around. First, the 
financial crisis had led to the launch of a series of new measures supporting entrepreneurs and 
small business owners in a tight credit market. Second, the election of the Conservative-
Liberal Coalition government headed by David Cameron brought in a renewed focus on 
entrepreneurship and business. With this focus came several new programs, such as the 
Regional Growth Fund, Startup Loans and the New Enterprise Allowance. In the years since 
the election, these new funds have led to renewed growth for the sector. These funds are 
complemented by the extension of the PROGRESS programme to UK CDFIs (“First Progress 
Microfinance agreement with internet lender Ezbob and the EIF,” 2014). At the same time the 
sector itself is becoming more and more mature with rising levels of sustainability and 
professionalism. Today the CDFI sector is alive and well in the UK with over £250 million 
worth of outstanding loans and lending to nearly 15,000 businesses (CDFA, 2014a). 
2.4 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter I presented the historical backdrop for microfinance. First, the post-war era saw 
the proliferation of subsidised credit to promote human and economic development, and the 
problematic aspects of this approach. Subsequently, I looked at the emergence and spread of 
microfinance as a hybrid tool to provide credit to the financially excluded. While not without 
controversies, the success of this model caused it to spread to other developing countries and 
eventually to developed countries as well. I showed how microfinance was adopted as a 
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measure to address the lack of functioning financial markets in the former Soviet countries, 
and how it has emerged as a measure – first as a grassroots movement, later driven by the 
European Union – among Western European countries to address social and financial 
exclusion. 
Finally I provided a short summary of the development of microfinance in Norway, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom was provided. Looking at the three cases at a whole some tendencies 
emerges: After a promising start, the Norwegian development split and eventually stalled 
towards the end of the 2000s. In Sweden, there is also a split, but whereas the grassroots 
initiatives have struggled, the government initiative has continued to thrive. Finally, in the UK 
there is no such split, and despite signs of slowing down towards the end of the 2000s, 
microfinance has nevertheless thrived and continues to do so. In all three cases microfinance 
emerged around the same time, but there are considerable difference in performance. Is it 
possible to explain this variation? As I return and elaborate more thoroughly on the three 
cases in Chapter six the argument is that this is indeed possible.  
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3 Literature Review 
Now that we have seen historical developments of microfinance, let us turn to what the 
literature say on its actual impact. Does microfinance actually work, or is it the appeal of a 
market-based approach to development assistance that has attracted support from donors and 
governments across the world? This chapter outlines the literature on microfinance impact. 
Next, I discuss the issue of microfinance sustainability, before I say a few words on 
microfinance and public policy. Finally I discuss some of the deficiencies and methodological 
challenges that the current literature suffers from. 
3.1 Does microfinance work? 
Impact in developing countries 
Is microfinance effective at addressing poverty and exclusion in developing countries? The 
tendency in the literature points weakly towards positive impacts. On the one hand, an early 
study of the impact of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh by Hossain in 1988 shows that on 
average, Grameen members had 43% higher income than that of target non-participants in 
villages without any presence from the Grameen Bank, and 28% higher than non-participants 
in villages with presence from the Grameen Bank (Goldberg, 2005, p. 6). Studying 
Bangladesh between 1991/92 and 2011/12, Khandker and Samand (2013) finds that 
microfinance works particularly well on reducing extreme poverty, and that microfinance 
intervention may account for as much as 9 percent of the total povery reduction in Bangladesh 
over the last decade. 
One the other hand, a study quoted by Schrenier and Sharma (1999, p. 69) found that on 
average microfinance interventions tend to stabilise rather than increase income, and preserve, 
rather than create jobs. Another study conducted on microfinance clients in Hyderabad, India, 
showed some effect of microfinance on business income in the top end, but no effect in terms 
of health, education, and women’s empowerment (Duflo, Banerjee, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 
2013). A literature review conducted by Duvendack et. al. (2011) concludes that from the few 
strong studies that exist, no discernable effect on well-being and women empowerment is 
found. 
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One problem is that studies emphasise different aspects of microfinance. In their review of the 
literature between 1989 and 1998 Schreiner and Sharma survey the results of twenty studies 
on microfinance interventions. Acknowledging the many dimensions that microfinance 
addresses, they classify the results using indicators of human capital, physical capital, social 
capital, income and environment. Results are scored as positive, mixed, or negative. Their 
summary, which is reproduced below shows how results differ across the various indicators. 
Table 3.1: Microfinance and impact on welfare (taken directly from Schreiner & Sharma 1999, p. 88) 
 
The impact of Business Development Services (BDS) such as training in accounting, 
marketing, and other parts of the business, has also been the focus of scholars. One study 
from Bolivia cited in Sievers and Vandenberg (2007, p. 1350) found that people who received 
BDS performed better with their business than those who did not. Moreover, McKernan 
(2002) found that non-credit aspects of participation in microfinance programs increased 
enterprise profits between 84% and 173% after controlling for the effect of access to capital. 
This finding is particularly interesting, considering the importance of business development 
services in the Western context.  
Impact in developed countries 
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Comprehensive quantitative impact studies of microfinance interventions, including the 
effects of BDS in developed countries, are rare. An explanation might be that the small scale 
of European microfinance interventions likely makes such studies more difficult. One of the 
few such studies from the United Kingdom showed a fairly strong impact of microfinance 
business lending on reducing inner city poverty (Lenton & Mosley, 2012). Most studies, 
however, use “softer” indicators of success and rely on surveys and questionnaires of clients. 
One such study of ADIE in France from 2011 measures microfinance impact on income and 
quality of life, and finds a positive impact of the intervention (Aldeghi & Olm, 2011). 
Another early study on the clients of ACCION in the United States showed that microfinance 
increased income and profits, as well as providing qualitative benefits such as pride, self-
realisation, and community participation (Himes, 1998).  
In the absence of academic studies, program evaluations and annual reports from the MFIs 
themselves can give an impression of the impact of microfinance in Europe. Here impact is 
typically measured in client satisfaction and jobs created or safeguarded. For example, a 2010 
evaluation of the CDFI sector found that the impact of the outstanding loan portfolio on the 
local level was 1,705 new businesses created and 1,372 safeguarded; 3,635 jobs created and 
3,618 safeguarded; £560 million of new turnover generated, and £788 million safeguarded 
(GHK Consulting Ltd, 2010, p. 79). Another study by the French MFI ADIE attempted to 
calculate the opportunity cost of welfare and self-employment. This study found that the cost 
of becoming self-employed would amount to €4,000, whereas the cost of unemployment 
benefits would amount to €18,600, not including lost tax revenue and national insurance 
contribution (Evers et al., 2007, p. 30). 
3.2 Microfinance sustainability 
One could argue that almost any policy will work as long as enough money is being spent on 
it. Part of the attractiveness of microfinance, however, lies in its potential to be a cost 
effective measure to reduce poverty and social exclusion. A key debate within the 
microfinance community is the role of subsidies and sustainability. Many donor agencies, 
such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), have made the argument that 
financial and operational self-sustainability should be the goal of all microfinance 
interventions. They call this a “win-win” situation (Morduch, 2000, p. 617).  
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The “win-win” argument is based on the premise that sustainability is achieved through either 
sufficiently high interest rates, or with sufficient scale. Donors argue that the poor are not 
sensitive to high or low interest rates. By subsidising low interest rates governments and 
donor agencies are merely creating incentives to uphold inefficient practices. Furthermore, 
scale leads to better access for the poor, savings mobilisation, and more efficient services, 
while governments and development agencies save money and avoid the risk cronyism 
Sustainability creates a positive outcome for everyone, thus achieving greater impact in terms 
of poverty reduction. 
Others argue that although sustainability on its own is a good thing, it is often either 
unfeasible or ignores social– or other non-economic considerations. Targeted subsidies help 
to provide credit to the poorest segment of the population, which is and important end in itself 
even if not sustainable. Whereas large non-governmental organisations such as BRAC can 
cross-subsidise less profitable programs, demands for sustainability might force smaller MFIs 
to slash programs on education and business training in order to balance their budgets. 
Moreover, the push for sustainability can cause MFIs to “graduate” away from their original 
clients towards the less poor (Johnson, 1998, p. 801). Morduch (2000, p. 624) argues instead 
that “pricing” social benefits into the budget and reward system of the MFI leads to a more 
nuanced focus on sustainability.  
What do the numbers say? In one study from 2003, only 66 out of 124 MFIs surveyed were 
sustainable. For MFIs serving the low-end of the market the number was just 18 out of the 49 
surveyed (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 232). While sustainability has 
improved since then many MFIs still rely on subsidies. For example, Grameen Bank, which 
calls itself subsidy-free still receives loans that might have an interest rate of one percent and 
a maturity of twenty years (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 236).  
The situation for MFIs operating in developed countries is even more pronounced: In 2005, 
programs in the US supported by ACCION International managed to reach a level of self-
sufficiency ranging from 32-80% (Burrus, 2006, p. 20). In Europe 40% of all MFIs rely on 
subsidies to cover at least 75% of their operational costs (Evers et al., 2007, p. 23). A UK 
evaluation conducted by GHK in 2010 showed that the median CDFI in 2006/07 was 30% 
operationally sustainable, while the corresponding figure for 2007/08 was 39% (GHK 
Consulting Ltd, 2010, p. iv). These tendencies are reinforced by the fact that European MFIs 
and banks are reluctant to charge the kinds of interest rates required for sustainability, either 
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because of anti-usury laws that sets a cap on interest rates, or because of reputational concerns 
(European Commission, 2007, p. 20). Moreover, arrears are typically higher than those in 
developing countries. For example, average ninety-day arrears rate for UK CDFIs were 
around 20% for the period 2002-2009, compared to 3% for developing countries (Lenton & 
Mosley, 2012, p. 13)  
The situation is nevertheless slowly improving. In Eastern Europe operational sustainability 
has recently been achieved in several countries (see Bendig, Unterberg, & Sarpong, 2012) 
The UK situation has also recently improved somewhat: the 2013 industry overview reported 
31% of CDFIs attaining operational self-sustainability, with a further 21% covering 90% of 
costs (CDFA, 2014b, p. 14). Unfortunately the diversity of the sector and lack of good data 
makes it difficult to paint an accurate picture of the issue of sustainability. This leads me 
directly to the next point on methodological considerations. 
3.3 Microfinance and public policy 
Even more lacking than studies on performance and sustainability are studies that engage in 
the intersection between public policy and microfinance. Some studies look at microfinance 
from a perspective of government business promotion. In their study of IN’s microfinance 
initiative in Norway Ellingsen and Lotherington attempt to create ideal types for how the 
initiative is managed by the authorities. Moreover, they identify a conflict between authorities 
and the grassroots based on different perception of management (Lotherington & Ellingsen, 
2002). Other studies look at the legal and regulatory framework governing microfinance in 
Europe (see e.g. Basel Committee on Bankin Supervision, 2010; Thomson Reuters 
Foundation, 2011).  
Given the origins in development economics, however, little emphasis is placed on 
institutional and political factors as supposed to economic factors. I have only been able to 
find one single paper that explicitly deals with the relationship between microfinance and 
public policy. This paper focuses on the political process leading up to the European Union’s 
adoption of microfinance as a policy measure (see Unterberg, 2008). This is unfortunate, as 
the intersection between public policy and microfinance is of particular importance in Europe. 
As subsidies generally come from the state, the issue of impact and sustainability is of great 
interest among policymakers. 
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3.4 Some methodological considerations 
A problem with assessing microfinance performance is the lack of good quality data. A 2011 
comprehensive literature review of over two thousand articles on microfinance argues that 
much of the existing literature suffers from weak research designs. After screening out these 
they are left with 58 studies, of which only two are randomised controlled trials (Duvendack 
et al., 2011, pp. 2–3).  
This is necessarily the cause of bad science: all microfinance interventions look different, face 
different hurdles, and apply to different circumstances, and measuring impact is therefore 
complicated. This creates a heterogeneous body of literature as studies use differing 
methodologies and look at different aspects of implementation, with some focusing on the 
gender aspect, others on the social aspect, and yet others on the income aspect (Goldberg, 
2005, p. 46). A microfinance intervention might be considered a success in terms of social 
outreach, but a failure in terms of poverty reduction, and vice versa. Morduch (2000, p. 624) 
has argued that so-called social transfer prices could potentially have a large impact on how 
one measure the success of microfinance interventions. In practice, however, this approach is 
limited by methodological challenges with regards to the operationalisation of social benefits. 
Reports often simply conclude that “microfinance works” based on measures such as client 
satisfaction in surveys.  
Moreover, Schrieder and Sharma (1999, p. 82) argue that these problems are compounded by 
issues of bias as most studies focus on successful MFIs rather than those who have failed. 
Some MFIs even resist the use of impact assessment because they think they do not “fit” their 
particular situation or fail to take into considerations social impacts and will therefore judge 
them negatively. Pritchett (2003) even suggests that MFIs have incentives to avoid impact 
studies, as a negative result may threaten their funding. In practice, MFIs are also usually 
understaffed and underfunded, which make them reluctant to engage in expensive impact 
assessments (Evans, 2011, p. 6). 
Another reason for the difficulty of engaging in serious impact studies in developed countries 
is the many counterfactuals that must be asked. What would the alternative been for the poor? 
Often studies, such as the above mentioned ADIE study rests on dichotomies of dubious 
nature, like “what is the opportunity cost of using microfinance versus being on welfare?” 
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This is especially the case in developed countries, where the alternative to microfinance is not 
simply poverty, but some kind of alternative competing policy. 
3.5 Summary and conclusion 
Summing up, we see that there are moderately strong indications that microfinance is a useful 
tool for poverty alleviation and financial inclusion. While Duvendack et. al.’s meta-study 
finds no conclusive evidence, other meta-studies, such as the one by Scrieder and Sharma, 
finds a more positive tendency. The positive tendency increases when measuring additional 
indicators such as social value, and Morduch argues that this approach captures a more 
nuanced picture of microfinance performance. 
Furthermore, when it comes to sustainability the overall picture is that microfinance 
initiatives by and large still struggle with dependence on subsidies. This is especially the case 
for MFIs who engage in business development services, as well as those targeting the poorest 
segment of the market. This is the case in developing as well as developed countries. While 
there are tendencies of improvement, it is likely that certain MFIs will never become 
operationally self-sustainable. 
Finally, the field is plagued by the lack of thorough research. The few rigorous studies often 
fail to find a clear effect of microfinance whereas studies that get “down and dirty” tend to 
find a positive impact of microfinance, but struggles with low external validity and potential 
biases. The academic literature on microfinance and public policy is nearly non-existent. This 
is problematic as states remain the chief financier of microfinance initiatives in Europe. The 
next chapter on theoretical aspects will attempt to address this gap. 
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4 Theory 
This chapter outlines the theoretical aspects of microfinance. Although they are not directly 
relevant for my analysis, I have nevertheless chosen to briefly present the core concepts of 
microfinance for the reader to gain an understanding of what microfinance actually is. After 
presenting the core theoretical elements, I proceed to discuss their relevance in developed 
countries. I argue that the highly developed market economies in developed countries makes 
the theoretical underpinnings of microfinance less relevant. Instead I present microfinance in 
the context of the social economy and social entrepreneurship, and argue that this is a more 
useful conceptualisation of microfinance in a developed context. Finally, I make the case that 
public policy is the key aspect to study in order to explain the success of microfinance 
initiatives in developed countries, and proceed to present two theories of public policy that 
will provide an analytical framework for understanding the relationship between microfinance 
and policy. 
4.1 How does microfinance work? 
Conventional economic theory states that because of the law of diminishing marginal returns 
to factors of production, developing countries should be an attractive target for investment. 
Returns to capital should be higher relative to that of a capital-abundant country, and the poor 
in those developing countries should therefore be able to pay higher interest rates, which in 
turn increases profit for banks (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 5) 
This is, however not the case. As shown by the figure below there is a strong relationship 
between economic development and the depth of credit markets. Put simply, the reason we do 
not see more bank lending in developing countries is risk. After the loan is given the lender 
has no way of knowing for certain whether that money is going to be repaid or not: while the 
borrower might say he will invest the money in his farm, he might be spending it instead on 
the stock market. This is a problem of asymmetric information (Armendáriz de Aghion & 
Morduch, 2005, p. 7). Only the borrower knows in truth whether he is a trustworthy person or 
not; the lender can only infer from the information the borrower gives him or the one that he 
can observe from his actions.  
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The lender will therefore have to trust the borrower blindly, or device some kind of agreement 
that creates incentives for repayment. Thus, rather than being purely governed by the price 
mechanism, i.e. supply and demand, finance is also influenced by agreements (contracts) 
between asymmetrically informed partners. In finance, this asymmetry of information gives 
rise to what is often termed the “principle–agent problem.” This problem arises when two 
contracting parties have different interests: the lender (principal), one the one hand, wishes to 
receive back his money in due time with the interest agreed upon. The borrower (agent) on 
the other hand, might prefer not to repay the loan at all. The task is then for the principal to 
get the agent to act in the principals interest (Martimort, 2008). This task involves two 
primary challenges, namely those of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection, moral hazard, and transaction costs 
Adverse selection arises because agents have incentives to misrepresent information about 
whether they are risky or not (Morduch, 1999, p. 1570). In short, a bank or lender cannot 
ensure that the borrower will make a credible commitment to repay the loan. In the case of 
finance the borrower will have incentives to withhold information that might affect the 
lender’s assessment of his creditworthiness negatively, such as past borrowing history, 
appetite for risk, and planned use for the loan. For example, investment into crops and 
fertilizer is generally less risky than investment in risky stocks. A borrower will therefore 
have an incentive to convince a bank that he will buy fertilizer, even if the plan is to gamble 
on the stock market. In technical terms: risky borrowers do not fully internalise the costs 
associated with lending, which instead are borne by the bank, and therefore risky borrowers 
can outbid safe borrowers competing for the same loans (Ray, 1998, p. 580). The bank must 
therefore make sure there are screening mechanisms that can reveal potentially withheld 
information of the borrower. If those mechanisms can reveal a risky borrower the bank will 
demand a higher interest rate to compensate for the added risk, or refuse to give the loan 
outright.  
Moral hazard arises after the loan has been given. It occurs because when the loan is given the 
bank takes on all of the risk: the borrower has all the money and the bank has none! Even if a 
contract specifies the terms agreed upon for the repayment of the loan there is no guarantee 
that the borrower will actually uphold such a contract. As the bank will have to physically 
give up possession of the money being lent out, there is a chance that when the time for 
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repayment comes the borrower might not be willing or able to honour his obligation 
(Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 7). Perhaps he lost all the money on the stock 
market, or decided to move to another city. The solution to moral hazard is therefore to 
demand some form of collateral: the opportunity cost of losing a prized possession such as a 
house or car creates sufficient incentives for the borrower to uphold the contract and repay his 
debt. 
Adverse selection, moral hazard and the principle-agent problem all affect what is called the 
transaction costs of financial activity. Dahlman (1979, p. 148) groups these into three 
categories: search and information costs refer to the costs associated with finding safe 
borrowers; bargaining and decision costs refer to the costs of settling the terms of the loan; 
enforcement and policing costs refer to costs associated with making sure contracting parties 
uphold their end of the deal. Combined, these can account for a large amount of the costs 
associated with contracting: one study estimated that transaction costs accounted over half of 
total costs in the American economy in 1970 (Wallis & North, 1986, p. 120). Transaction 
costs are more manageable when there are few actors involved, but as scale increases the 
number of borrowers becomes harder to administrate, as each contract requires the bank to 
gather the necessary information to assess the risk profile of the customer, negotiate a contract 
that both parties can accept, and ensure that those contracts are enforced. This necessarily 
increases costs, which must be then offset by higher interest rates and fees.  
Financial exclusion and the informal market 
Banks in developing countries usually lack the kind of information gathering capabilities 
necessary to assess the riskiness of the poor. These clients usually live in inaccessible rural 
villages, have no credit history, and if they had there are no centralised records for the bank to 
consult. Moreover, banks have difficulty reducing the moral hazard. There are two reasons for 
this: first, the poor usually lack access to collateral, which creates incentives to repay the loan 
and prevents the borrower from defaulting; and second, the enforcement capacity of the state 
is weak and underdeveloped (Ferrand, 2013, p. 463). Moreover, financial literacy – the ability 
to understand basic information about financial products and services – is low, so borrowers 
do not fully understand the kind of agreement they are entering (Staschen & Nelson, 2013, pp. 
76–7).  
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The result is that the poor are excluded from conventional sources of finance. Data from the 
World Bank shows that worldwide 2.5 billion people and 75% of the world’s poor do not 
have a bank account (The World Bank, 2012). Moreover, financial exclusion and economic 
growth correlate with one another. The lower the gross national income per capita, the less 
likely a person is to have an account at a formal financial institution (Ferrand, 2013, p. 461). 
In the absence of conventional banks financial markets are therefore left to informal actors. 
Informal actors encompass family, relatives, moneylenders and loan sharks (Todaro & Smith, 
2006, p. 745). One study showed that in Indonesia, over 70 percent of the population uses 
some form of informal finance (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 57). Because 
informal actors have a local presence they are often better situated to judge risk than an urban 
bank. It also allows them to accept alternative forms of collateral, such as harvests and labour, 
which would be impractical for a conventional bank (Ray, 1998, p. 573). Finally, they are to a 
greater extent able to enforce agreements or renegotiate terms if borrowers have trouble 
repaying the loans. For example, if the lender is a relative kinship ties can be effectively used 
to create incentives for borrowers to repay.  
The drawback of informal actors, however, is that they tend to charge usurious rates of 
interest, where the result is that the poor become trapped in cycles of perpetual debt. One 
early survey of moneylenders from the Punjab region in India showed annual interest rates 
ranging between 134 and 159 percent (Singh, 1983, p. 252). Another study from Ghana, 
Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania found informal market interest rates at least 50% percent 
above formal market rates (Steel, Aryeetey, Hettige, & Nissanke, 1997, p. 823). 
Microfinance innovations 
The innovations engendered in microfinance combine the information-gathering capabilities 
of informal lenders with the organisational strength and stability of a regular bank, thereby 
making finance accessible to millions of previously excluded poor. According to Morduch 
(1999, p. 1579), the most important of these innovations are first: group lending; second: 
dynamic incentives; third: regular repayment schedules; and fourth: collateral substitutes. 
While each of these ‘innovations’ has a long history prior to the advent of microfinance, the 
application is novel. The promise of microfinance is that by applying these principles the 
problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and prohibitive transaction costs are mitigated. 
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The group lending is by far the most studied mechanism of microfinance, and the one touted 
as its most important. Its logic builds on that of the ROSCA:4 groups of four to seven people 
come together to apply for a loan. If the loan is repaid a new loan is given, and so on. If some 
of the members of the group fail to repay the group with come together will the MFI and work 
out some form of new repayment plan. If that does not help, the group as a whole is barred 
from making any new loans. The group allows members to pool together resources and 
thereby increase the size of loan; but more importantly, the social pressures associated by 
joint liability creates powerful incentives for the individuals to uphold their responsibility and 
repay the loan (Ray, 1998, p. 752). Since most poor lack collateral, joint liability addresses 
the challenge of moral hazard. Furthermore, the group has an important screening function: 
because individuals coming together to form a group prefer to associate themselves with other 
trustworthy people, some of the costs associated with information gathering are borne by the 
borrowers rather than the MFI. This mechanism, called positive assortative matching, 
addresses the risk of adverse selection (Ray, 1998, p. 580)  
In addition to group lending, microfinance takes advantage of dynamic incentives. This means 
that if a group succeeds in repaying a loan in the first period, the size of the loan increases in 
the next period, and so on. This method is a cornerstone of the Grameen model, where an 
initial “test loan” is given to assess the viability of the group before regular lending starts. 
This practice is also widespread in Western adoption of microfinance (Wiggen, 2005, p. 71). 
Dynamic incentives address the problem of moral hazard: successful repayment increases the 
loan over time. Borrowers will only gain access to the larger sums if they demonstrate 
diligence and loyalty; defaulting from one loan with the intention of getting a new loan 
elsewhere forces the borrower to start from scratch. 
Next, regular repayment schedules mean that unlike conventional business loans, where the 
principal and interest is repaid in full at the end of the period, repayments start almost 
immediately after the loan is disbursed. The advantages of this are several: first, undisciplined 
borrowers are quickly revealed to the group and loan officers; second, because some money 
must be repaid even before the investment bears fruit, it means that the household must have 
some additional income, which acts as quasi-collateral (Rogaly, 1996, p. 104). 
                                                
4 See Chapter 2.1 
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Finally, there is the case of collateral substitutes. In most cases the poor cannot provide the 
necessary collateral. Collateral substitutes include, for example, mandatory savings, where 
borrowers are forced to set aside a small sum every week for an “emergency fund” in case of 
default. Other forms include items that might not have value to the bank, but which have great 
value to the borrower (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005, p. 135). Interestingly this 
mimics some of the practices typically carried out by the informal lender, and illustrates the 
potential of microfinance to draw on the strengths of both formal and informal finance. 
4.2 And how does it work in developed countries? 
It should come as no surprise that while financial exclusion exists everywhere, the 
circumstances under which European MFIs operate are considerably different from those in 
developing countries. In developed states the issues of moral hazard, adverse selection and 
transaction cost have to a large extent been solved. Adverse selection is mitigated through the 
widespread adoption of information and communication technology, which allows banks to 
access records of credit history and use mathematical models to assess potential borrowers. 
These countries also have well-developed judicial and regulatory institutions, which ensure 
that enforcement costs are kept down: a defaulting borrower cannot simply move to another 
part of the country and be in the clear. In other words, search and information costs as well as 
enforcement costs are low, which allows conventional finance to reach a greater portion of the 
population.  
We have nevertheless seen in Chapter 2 that even in Europe almost 10% of the population 
faces financial exclusion. These are often low-skilled people with weak attachment to the 
labour market. Moreover, European countries are characterised by formal and highly 
developed capitalist economies. Under these circumstances merely supplying cheap capital is 
typically not enough for a potential microentrepreneur to survive and thrive. Common for 
microfinance initiatives in the West is therefore that they not only engage in lending, but also 
put heavy emphasis on ‘microcredit plus,’ i.e. various forms of business support and training 
services, such as marketing, accounting practices, and other activities (Evers et al., 2007, p. 
10). 
Social exclusion, social economy, and microfinance 
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In the Western context financial exclusion is often considered a facet of the broader concept 
of social exclusion. Gonzales defines social exclusion as the alienation from economic, 
political, and cultural institutions (Gonsales, 2007, p. 122). A similar definition provided by 
Rogaly and Fischer is a “process which brings about a lack of citizenship, whether economic, 
political, or social” (Rogaly et al., 1999, p. 3). They argue these phenomena have complex 
links that tie them together with one another, and where one often feed into the other. Perhaps 
the most typical form of social exclusion is unemployment. While poverty does not mean 
being social excluded, it increases the chances of such an outcome. Studies from Italy show 
being financially excluded correlated with being socially excluded as well (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 48).  
Ever since the Beveridge Report was released in 1942, there has been a firm understanding in 
Europe of social issues as being under the purview of the state. A traditional conceptualisation 
of social democracy considers it as a compromise between labour and capital, where the state 
cushions negative consequences of competition, such as unemployment. In his book on the 
variations of capitalist welfare states, Gøsta Esping-Andersen coins the term 
“decommodification” as a measure of the degree to which welfare systems can allow citizens 
to “freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when 
they themselves consider it necessary” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 23). In other words, how 
easy it is to not work without suffering negative consequences. In states with a high degree of 
decommodification it is easy for people to step out of the labour market without consequence, 
while in states with a low degree of decommodification this would have adverse effects. 
Connecting this concept to social exclusion we can say that low levels of decommodification 
increase chances of social exclusion. 
Today the welfare state is the chief “decommodifying” force in Europe. Historically, 
however, there has been a range of non-state actors working to alleviate these societal 
ailments, including, charities, voluntary organisations, and so on. But other actors do not fit 
into this category. While these actors’ goals are ultimately of a social nature most of them in 
fact work within the boundaries of the market. This can be referred to as the social economy.5 
The range of social economy actors is large, from cooperatives and credit unions to firms 
employing ex-convicts to renovate apartments. They nevertheless elude the traditional binary 
categorisation of either state or market: while they are not operating on a voluntary basis, they 
                                                
5 Alternatively the third sector, which is the most common term for the concept in the United Kingdom 
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are not profit maximising either. These actors can be said to be operating within a “social 
economy.” According to Noya and Clarence (2007, p. 10) the idea of the social economy 
seeks to “capture both the social element as well as the economic element, inherent in those 
organisations which inhabit the space between the market and the state.” 
Furthermore, in many European countries the welfare state is under increasing pressures. 
Alongside what many considers a decline of the welfare state in many developed countries 
over the last few decades, the concept of the social economy has gained increased prominence 
(Ash, Cameron, & Hudson, 2002, pp. 5–6). Conning and Morduch (Conning & Morduch, 
2011, p. 409) argue that social investments makes business sense too: while orthodox 
proponents of the free market argue that firms should only care about maximising shareholder 
value they argue that if markets are imperfect, mixing business and philanthropy can make 
sense. Microfinance can be understood as an example of an actor social economy (Noya & 
Clarence, 2007, p. 26). It certainly operates in the social economy space: target groups, as we 
have seen, are usually excluded from mainstream sources of finance, dependent on welfare, 
and are on the fringes of society. Moreover, microfinance initiatives are usually non-profit, 
only attempting to cover costs and investments into capacity.  
Advocates of microfinance have often been grassroots activists attempting to create positive 
change in people’s lives. These activists are called social entrepreneurs. A social entrepreneur 
specialises in solving social problem using approaches from the business world. Thus the 
social entrepreneur fills the gaps that exist between the state and the market. Success is 
measured by the impact the business has on the society, rather than profits. (DAMVAD, 2012, 
p. 10). As argued by Tan et. al. (2005, p. 353) social entrepreneurs promise an altruistic form 
of capitalism that does not evaluate all human activities in business terms. In their review of 
the concept of social entrepreneurship, Peredo and McLean (2006, p. 63) present a table 
illustrating the whole range of activities that can be defined within its scope. The opacity of 
the text refers to the importance of the social or commercial goals for the enterprises 
belonging in that category: bold text means that the goals are very important, whereas 
transparent text means that the goals are not important at all 
Table 4.1 : Social entrepreneurship. Taken directly from Peredo & McLean (2006) 
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‘Social’ and ‘Entrepreneurial’ microfinance 
How is microfinance as a social economic actor relevant to our discussion? Within this 
context, although the challenge to European microfinance initiatives is fundamentally the 
same, the context is different, and the social economy dimension gives a more appropriate 
understanding of the function of a European MFI.  
Peredo and McLean’s table presents two dimensions of social enterprise. On the one hand 
there is the place of social goals. On the other hand is the role of commercial exchange. We 
can think of these to as being opposites on a continuum. The social economy perspective and 
the types of activities that fall within its scope are also important to understand the different 
nuances of microfinance. Roughly, microfinance can be divided into two main categories that 
correspond to the above typology: I) Microfinance initiatives that emphasise the social 
aspect, and II) microfinance initiatives that emphasise the entrepreneurial aspect.  
The first “social category” deals more with microfinance as a tool for personal empowerment, 
integration and employment, and to give people meaning in their lives. It can also focus on 
the supply of cash to poor families. The second “entrepreneurial category” deals more with 
promoting business creation, often within growth-industries. It also focuses on financing 
SMEs under market imperfections, in face of capital constraints. Of course, this is no real 
dichotomy; there is no clear-cut division between the two ideals. The strength of microfinance 
is precisely that it always embodies a mix between both social and entrepreneurial goals. 
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Nevertheless, this distinction serves as a simply analytical tool to broadly classify the 
activities of a microfinance initiative.  
Below is a visualisation of this distinction, based on a model created by the European 
Microfinance Network. First, microfinance as a whole is divided into two subcategories. 
Moreover the social category in turn can be divided into personal and business loans. A 
segment of microfinance initiatives specialise in providing personal microfinance loans in 
order to compete with loan sharks and doorstep lenders. This category nevertheless only 
represents limited initiatives in select countries, and I will therefore exclude this category 
from the analysis. 
 
Figure 5.1: Types of microfinance. Based on model in (Bendig et al., 2012, p. 16) 
4.3 Public policy and microfinance 
Now that we have a good overview of the theoretical aspects of microfinance and its role 
within the social economy, let us turn to the theoretical elements that will guide the analysis 
of the political role of microfinance. While studies of microfinance usually focus on the 
development economics aspect of microfinance performance I have chosen to approach the 
issue of microfinance from a public policy perspective. We have already mentioned how 
some of the theoretical concepts are not very useful. Moreover, there are practical barriers as 
well. For example, joint reliability has little impact as long as financial laws prohibit clients 
for taking responsibility over other people’s loans. The development perspective only 
explains “half” of the picture. My thesis will try to explain the second half. 
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Sustainability or profitability, or even effectiveness, are not strictly necessary for 
microfinance initiatives to survive. I argue that the most important determinant of 
microfinance success is financial and political support from policymakers. We have already 
seen how microfinance initiatives are dependent upon funding from governments. Therefore, 
policy processes have been important in enabling microfinance initiatives to emerge. Policy 
windows such as elections therefore become important catalysts as policy makers open up to 
new and innovative ideas like microfinance. Policy support is also necessary to sustain 
microfinance initiatives. An unsustainable, or even inefficient microfinance initiative can be 
sustained as long as it fits policymakers’ definition of the problem is to be treated and what a 
good solution should look like. 
Focusing on a few selected concepts within policy theory I will try to explain why some 
microfinance initiatives have succeeded while others have not, and everything in between. 
The thesis therefore addresses a gap that exists in current literature. Investigations of 
microfinance in Western countries use either economic theory or are a-theoretical; the study 
of microfinance and EU policy formation was cited as one exception to this tendency. While 
the material is rich in descriptions of the various initiatives, there are few attempts at 
contextualising these findings into a framework where microfinance performance is 
contingent on the political processes that involved in competition for scarce public resources. 
Below I will now present the two core explanatory variables of my argument. 
4.3.1 The policy window 
How do policies emerge? In his influential work on the workings of U.S. politics, Kingdon 
proposes three streams that together determine the successful adoption of a policy. First, the 
problem stream deals with the various issues that present themselves to policymakers. 
Problems emerge through systematic indicators, focusing events, or feedback from current 
policies. Second, the policy stream deals with the alternatives that present themselves to 
policymakers as solutions to those problems. Policy proposals constantly float around, but 
whether they are given serious attention depends on several things, such as feasibility, 
national mood, and fit with dominant values. Third, the political stream deals with politicians 
and their willingness to implement those solutions. Government or legislative turnovers, 
national mood, or coalition makeups are all examples of elements within the political stream. 
(Kingdon, 2014, pp. 19–20). 
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The three streams are largely independent of each other, but when they meet and couple, 
policy changes are likely to occur. This occurs when so-called policy windows open up. 
Policy windows open up because of the appearance of pressing problems or changes in the 
political stream (Kingdon, 2014, p. 20). When these policy windows are open, the decision 
agenda of governments becomes more malleable to the influence of external forces seeking to 
influence policymaking. Think only of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and its lasting impact on the 
conduct of U.S. domestic and foreign policy, where consequences include the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the creation of the entirely new Department of Homeland Security.  
Moreover, policy windows can be predictable or unpredictable. Kingdon uses the example of 
the collapse of the Penn State Railroad: in the wake of the collapse a number of policy 
measures came up, many not directly related to the case at hand, proposals about subsidies, 
deregulation, nationalisation, loan guarantees, roadbed rehabilitations, and so on (Kingdon, 
2014, pp. 171–174).  
Open policy windows are periods of opportunity. They allow actors outside of the 
government to access and influence the agenda. These actors subsequently use this influence 
to push their pet proposal as a solution to the policy issues that have emerged. Usually 
proposed policy solutions are tied explicitly to the problem at hand, but sometimes this 
connection might be vague. There is no automaticity in what kind of solutions a specific 
policy window calls for: it is often a chaotic and uncontrolled process, where a number of 
solutions enter and attempt to compete for attention from policy makers.  
4.3.2 Problems and problem definitions 
Policy problems and the definition of these are contested. According to Rochefort and Cobb 
(1993 p.57) policymaking has often been understood from a “rationality perspective” where 
social problems present themselves to public officials, who in turn assess the problem on the 
basis of all available knowledge and subsequently act accordingly through legislation until the 
problem is solved. This perspective, however, does not correspond to empirical evidence. In 
the words of Dery (1984) (quoted in Rochefort & Cobb, 1993, p. 55) “problems do not exist 
‘out there’; they are no objective entities in their own.” What ought to be considered a policy 
problem, how to understand that problem, and what a solution to that problem should look 
like, all depend on the perceptions and interests of actors involved. 
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Rochefort and Cobb list five dimensions of problems that shape problem definitions. These 
are as follows: first, the cause of the problem; second, the nature of the problem, including 
aspects such as severity, incidence, and novelty; third, characteristics of the problem 
population; fourth, ends-means orientation of the problem definer; and fifth, the nature of the 
solution (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993, p. 62). These dimensions are accompanied by various 
options for the policy response. For example, the characteristics of the problem population 
might be defined by whether the group is considered worthy or unworthy. Similarly the cause 
of a problem might be attributed to personal or impersonal causes. The table below 
summarises Rochefort and Cobb’s anatomy of problem description. 
Table 5.2: Anatomy of Problem Description, taken from Rochefort and Cobb (1993, p. 62) 
An anatomy of Problem Description 
Dimension of Problem Options 
Problem Causation Personal – impersonal 
Intended – accidental 
Blame allocated – blame avoided 
Simple – complex 
Nature of the problem 
Severity 
Incidence 
 
Novelty 
Proximity 
Crisis 
 
Degrees of severity 
Growing, stable or declining: by class, population, 
cohort, age etc. 
Unprecedented – familiar 
Personally relevant – a general social concern 
Crisis – noncrisis 
Emergency - nonemergency 
Characteristics of the 
Problem Population 
Worthy – unworthy 
Deserving – undeserving 
Familiar – strange 
Sympathetic – threatening 
Ends – Means 
orientation of Problem 
Definer 
Instrumental – expressive 
Nature of the solution Available – nonexistent 
Acceptable – objectionable 
Affordable – unaffordable 
  
4.4 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I outlined the main theoretical mechanisms underpinning microfinance, such as 
the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, and transaction costs. Through 
mechanisms such as group loans, stepped lending, and joint collateral microfinance is able to 
resolve some of these problems, thereby reducing transaction costs. I nevertheless argued that 
these mechanisms were less relevant in a European context, as I) the economic and legal 
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system already solves some of the problems, and II) the highly formal and competitive market 
economy makes self-employment more difficult. 
Moreover, European economies are characterised by welfare states, which allow people to 
step out of the labour market without suffering the same penalties as elsewhere. There is 
nevertheless financial and social exclusion in developed countries. I argue that microfinance 
therefore must be understood in the context of the social economy. The social economy and 
the actors within it attempt to create social value as opposed to purely economic value. Using 
market mechanisms they identify and try to fill the cracks and holes between the market and 
the state. Microfinance can therefore be conceptualised as an approach within the social 
economy. 
Finally I argue that there is little attention to the policy aspect within the literature on 
microfinance, despite this being perhaps the most important determinant of microfinance 
performance in developed countries. Subsequently I present theoretical perspectives on 
problem definition, social construction of target groups, as well as the policy formation 
process. In the next chapter I will use these perspectives to build a framework for analysing 
microfinance in Norway, Sweden, and the UK.  
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5 Research Design 
In this chapter I spell out how I will use the theoretical perspectives to analyse the three cases. 
I present simple model attempting to explain the relationship between policy windows, 
problem definitions, and political support for microfinance. I then proceed to discuss the 
methodical aspects of my design. I discuss the nature of the research, the rationale behind the 
selection of case, as well as how data has been collected analysed. Throughout the methodical 
section I will discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the design, and how they can 
be addressed. 
5.1 Building a theoretical framework 
How do the theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 4 relate to the introduction and 
performance of microfinance initiatives? We have seen how microfinance has been adopted in 
various developed countries, with various degrees of success. With the increasing focus on 
microfinance in the future, a relevant question to ask is what factors can explain the 
emergence of microfinance and the differences in success, also in developed countries. Here I 
revisit the research question: 
Which factors can explain the difference in political support of microfinance 
initiatives across developed countries in general, and between Norway, Sweden, and 
the UK in particular? 
 
Using this research question as a point of departure I focus on two aspects of the process. 
First, using the policy window aspect of Kingdon’s three streams theory, I look at the 
emergence of microfinance initiatives in the three countries and how political support 
influenced this process. Microfinance do not represent a reflexive policy option, something 
that is automatically there to respond to a specific problem; Rather, the hypothesis is that 
microfinance has been able to take advantage of the policy windows to present itself as a 
solution for policymakers.  
Second, I look at how the problem definition of microfinance has affected political support, 
and why political support has been secured. Microfinance cuts across many policy areas, and 
this means that how policymakers defines it will influence the policy process. Using a 
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simplified version of Rochefort and Cobb’s approach I focus on three aspects of problem 
definition: the problem itself; the target group, and the solution at hand. I collectively refer to 
these three aspects the problem elements. Moreover, I try to identify the various microfinance 
initiatives according to the ‘social’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ distinction. Finally I also look at the 
emergence of the concept of the social economy/third sector and how that affects how the 
actors define microfinance. 
Below I sketch out a simple model of the relationship between the policy variables and the 
support for microfinance. The ambition of the model is not to provide an exhaustive 
explanation of the three cases based on the dimensions presented in the table; rather the hope 
is that these dimensions can help us better understand the mechanisms that underpin the 
public support needed for the introduction and survival of microfinance in Western countries. 
 
Figure 5.1: Analytical model 
5.1.1 Spelling out the arguments 
Opening of policy windows 
As the model shows, I argue that the opening of policy windows influences the chances of 
microfinance receiving political support, which in turn influences its performance. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 policy windows open when pressing problems emerge or there are 
changes in the political stream, such as elections. Because it’s a new and relatively unknown 
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approach, microfinance is not widely known among politicians, and under normal 
circumstances receives little attention from policy makers. I argue that policy windows opens 
up politicians to new and innovative ideas, as well as allowing policy entrepreneurs and 
advocates outside of government to successfully influence the policy agenda. Elections, for 
example, bring in politicians eager to fulfil voter promises and create quick results. Crises put 
pressure on politicians and force them to consider alternative ideas. Conversely, when there is 
no policy windows open, the introduction of microfinance is a much slower process. 
Problem definition and framing of microfinance 
Next, I argue that how target groups are defined and how microfinance is framed as a solution 
to a specific problem also influences political support for microfinance. Microfinance is often 
advocated as an approach that joins goals that are of both social and economic character, and 
is used to target several policy issues, such as social exclusion, entrepreneurship, or regional 
development. I argue that if microfinance initiatives fit into policy makers’ definitions of 
problems, target groups, or solutions, they are more likely to receive political support. I also 
argue that while the many-faceted approach of microfinance makes it a flexible policy tool, 
this can lead to mismatches between different goals and competing definitions, and therefore 
a source of conflict that reduces political support for microfinance. 
This also implies that changes over time in problem definitions can give rise to such 
mismatches. For example, a new government or organisational developments within the 
bureaucracy might bring in new definitions of the problems, target groups, and solutions that 
favour different approaches. This might take away political support for microfinance.  
Furthermore, I argue that microfinance initiatives targeting groups perceived in a more 
positive light, such as entrepreneurs and small business owners, are more likely to receive 
support than those targeting relatively weaker groups, such as women and immigrants. 
Policymakers prefer giving out benefits to popular and powerful groups, whereas marginal 
and weak groups tend to slip under the radar. These groups and their needs is considered less 
important and worthy of official attention than those of numerous and powerful groups.  
5.2 Research design 
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A comparative case study 
This research project seeks to uncover and understand some of the political factors that 
influence the performance of microfinance initiatives in developed countries. The thesis takes 
the form of a qualitative case study. According to Gerring, case studies are useful in situations 
where the research goals are generating rather than testing hypotheses, where the goal is 
insight into causal mechanisms rather than the magnitude of causal effects, and where data 
availability is concentrated rather than dispersed (Gerring, 2007, p. 38). Gerring (2007, p. 40) 
also states that case studies may be useful when a subject is encountered for the first time or is 
being considered in a fundamentally new way.  
Case studies are sometimes criticised for providing limited grounds for generalisation, but we 
have already seen in Chapter 3 that little attention has been given to microfinance within the 
field of political science in the existing literature. Given the novelty of the approach I 
therefore argue that this thesis fits Gerring’s description well: I am investigating a subject in a 
new way; I’m not interested in testing hypotheses; the data is concentrated and not readily 
available; and the data gives little room for testing for causal effects. 
The design of this study can be described as lying somewhere between what Levy (2008, p. 5) 
calls a theory-guided case study, and a hypothesis-generating study. While the approach has 
been to apply concepts from public policy theory as a theoretical lens in order to “make 
sense” of an under-theorised field, the thesis goes beyond what Levy calls theory-guided case 
studies in that it attempts to say something about the relationship between microfinance and 
public policy in general, rather than just explaining the three cases. Although the main focus 
has been to explain and understand the outcome in the three cases, these explanations are in 
turn part of a broader goal to understand microfinance implementation in other developed 
countries.  
The thesis studies three countries, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Why compare? 
The first and foremost argument for comparing is control (Sartori, 1991, p. 244). By 
systematically collecting the same information across carefully selected units using theoretical 
guidance we strengthen our causal inferences (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 45). In only 
studying one case, for example Norway, one risks misattributing causal relationships where 
there are none. Control allows generalisations such as “entrepreneurially oriented 
microfinance is more likely to receive government support than socially oriented 
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microfinance” to be tested under different circumstances. If this holds only for Norway, this 
limits the value of this generalisation to explain microfinance in other countries. Another 
reason is that a comparative approach simply yields more data of how microfinance works in 
different countries: whereas Norway has had two institutions engaging in microfinance, 
Sweden has had at least four and the UK well over forty.  
Lijphart (1975, p. 164) explicitly defines the comparative method as hypothesis-testing, rather 
than hypothesis-generating or theory guided. This is too ambitious for my own research: First, 
balance of the data collected from the cases makes testing difficult. For practical reasons I 
have not been able to obtain equivalent data from all three countries. Moreover, the lack of 
well-defined control variables makes it difficult to rule out competing explanations. 
Nevertheless, the research attempts a form of dialogue between the testing, generating, and 
explaining: The three countries have been studied based on the theoretical framework. Where 
particular relationships or causal mechanisms have been found in a particular country, these 
have subsequently been compared to the two others in order to test whether these holds for all 
three cases. 
Case selection 
The cases studied are Norway, Sweden, and the UK. George and Bennet (2005, p. 69) argue 
that cases should not simply be chosen because they are interesting or because they are rich in 
data. It is nevertheless important to note that I have not selected these cases randomly, but 
rather on their various outcomes on microfinance performance. According to Geddes (1990), 
selection on the dependent variable in comparative studies is problematic because it can 
potentially lead to biased conclusions. In order to mitigate this threat I have chosen cases 
based on several criteria’s. First, both cases with positive and negative outcomes on the 
dependent variable have been chosen: microfinance has had the least public support in 
Norway, the most in the UK, with Sweden somewhere in between. This approach ensures 
variation among the cases and to some extent addresses the risk of misattribution. It should 
nevertheless be noted that as the research process has progressed it has become clear that such 
a dichotomous classification of the dependent variable is overly simplistic.  
Another way of viewing case selection is according to a most-similar most-different type of 
design (see Frendreis, 1983; Levy, 2008). Although these designs have been regarded as 
opposing ideals, Frenderis (1983, p. 269) nevertheless argues that both are informed by the 
46 
 
same logic, attempting “to identify variables related to the dependent phenomenon through 
covariation and eliminate (or control) other factors through the lack of covariation.” Similarly, 
Levy argues that maximising variation across independent and/or dependent variables 
stimulate the imagination and are useful for studies at a very early stage of exploratory 
research (Levy, 2008, p. 8). 
Using Norway as the baseline case the following rationale has informed my own selection: I 
have chosen the United Kingdom as a contrast case is because it has had a more successful 
implementation of microfinance than Norway. Furthermore, drawing on Esping-Andersen’s 
classification, Norway, Sweden, and the UK represents different forms of welfare capitalist 
systems. These systems might differ in their view on self-employment, the social economy, 
and entrepreneurship, all aspects influence microfinance. Sweden is selected because appears 
to have had a more successful implementation of microfinance compared with Norway and 
because similarly to Norway it is typically classified as a Nordic type of welfare state. This 
way I hope to address the problem of selection on the dependent variable, while at the same 
time maximising variation on background variables such as welfare state type. 
Data material and collection 
Data have been collected mainly from three sources. First, I have analysed government 
primary sources such as white papers, press releases, parliamentary committee publications, 
and parliamentary hearings. Second, I have analysed a range of secondary sources, mostly 
reports and evaluations, but also academic sources and news articles. Some of these are 
evaluations of individual MFIs, others deal with government funding programs, and yet others 
are annual reports and sectorial overviews at either the national or European level. Third, I 
have conducted five interviews with key informants as well as personal email correspondence 
with various sources. 
The coverage of the three cases is not balanced, in the sense that sources correspond with one 
another across the three counties. This is a result of several factors. In cases such as Norway, 
it has been much easier to obtain interview and historical data about individual microfinance 
initiatives. In the UK, which has a much larger sector than either Norway or Sweden, reports, 
public documents, and evaluations relating explicitly to microfinance have been much easier 
to obtain. While this lack of balance can be a source of bias, I nevertheless argue that the lack 
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of well establish procedures on the subject, compared with the relative explorative nature of 
the thesis, that this approach gives sufficient coverage. 
Only Norwegian actors have been interviewed in person. This choice is based on practical 
considerations, as establishing contact in the other countries is more difficult. Although this 
can potentially bias my findings, I have prioritised getting a more detailed insight into one 
particular country over a less detailed insight into all three countries. The findings from 
Norway have subsequently informed the data gathering in Sweden and the UK.  
Five interviews were conducted throughout the summer of 2014 to gain in-depth information 
from key informants that have been involved in various aspects of Norwegian microfinance 
initiatives: with Cultura Bank, Microfinance Norway, Innovation Norway, the Norwegian 
Labour and Welfare Administration, as well as a grassroots actor involved in the early efforts 
on introducing microfinance in Norway. The interviews therefore cover a range of actors that 
have been involved in microfinance, also ensuring a good breadth of data. They have been 
conducted in a semi-structured fashion (see Bryman, 2004, p. 321) where an interview guide 
have been prepared for each interview, based on my assumptions and the information needed. 
This has given me the opportunity to adjust the interview process when the questions have 
been irrelevant, and to follow up interesting leads. Where interviews have not been possible I 
have relied on email exchanges instead. I have communicated with one grassroots actor in 
Norway, two grassroots actors in Sweden, and one bank in Sweden in this manner. 
Interviews entail the risk of various biases, such as reporting bias or confirmation bias. For 
example, one interviewee had mixed up the order of events of a particular political process. 
Moreover, several of the actors had strong opinions of the events that had unfolded. For 
example, one informant went to the extent stating that the authorities had more or less 
sabotaged the microfinance pilot in question through unrealistic demands for documentation 
because they did not believe the results the pilot had achieved. Several of the actors also had a 
professional and personal stake in the portrayal of the events. As a researcher in such 
situations it is important to take these biases into consideration as they can threaten the 
internal validity of the causal inferences (see Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 529). These issues 
have been solved in several ways; first by crosschecking with various documents; second by 
cross-checking information with actors “on the other side of the table;” third, by contacting 
additional informants. These strategies have helped to address the biases. 
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To ensure confidentiality the informants have been anonymised. Rather than names, I will 
therefore refer to the actor or institution that the informant represents. To ensure the reliability 
of the process interviews have been recorded. In the case of the Norwegian grassroots 
informant the interview was conducted via phone, which made recording difficult. This 
interview has instead been transcribed to text. Quotes from informants are therefore followed 
by an abbreviation and time signature, for example (Interview MFI, 24:00), which marks 
where in the audio recording the quote is found. Permission to undertake the interviews have 
been obtained from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Below is a table 
listing the various sources I have consulted. 
Table 5.1: list of sources consulted 
Type 
 
Source Abbreviation in-text 
Interviews Microfinance Norway MFI 
Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration NLWA 
Cultura Bank CB 
Innovation Norway IN 
“Grassroots” informant in Norway GN 
Email Swedish Bank involved in pilot SB 
Project manager in Swedish pilot PM 
“Grassroots” informant in Sweden GS 
Written 
documents 
Primary sources: government publications, hearings  Not applicable 
Secondary sources: newspaper articles, reports, 
evaluations, 
Not applicable 
 
Method of analysis 
The research uses the data collected to analyse the three cases over time. I have focused on 
important milestones, such as the establishment or demise of a microfinance initiative, and 
traced the political process leading up to these events. Moreover I have attempted to analyse 
written and oral statements by politicians and other actors. While some indicators, such as 
government documents explicitly promoting microfinance, are easily identifiable, others are 
not. For example, identifying a policy window or a particular problem definition inevitably 
involves some form of interpretation of events or actors’ statements. In the cases where there 
has been uncertainty, I have therefore attempted to look for and provide additional pieces of 
evidence in order to strengthen my arguments. 
A problem of studying historical processes over time is the risk of post-hoc rationalisations. If 
my argument is that policy windows are important enablers of microfinance initiatives there is 
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a risk that when a microfinance initiative is observed, I will falsely concluded that a policy 
window was present. This is a form of confirmation bias, where the smallest sign of a policy 
window will be taken as sufficient evidence. The solution to this is to look at instances where 
a policy window would be exogenous to the process of introducing microfinance. Elections or 
external shocks are good examples of this, and we will later see that in most cases, the 
problem of post-hoc rationalisation can be addressed. In some cases, however, such as when it 
comes to the introduction of microfinance as a policy in Sweden, the evidence is less clear. I 
have simply not been able to obtain detailed knowledge of the process. This is something that 
I am aware of. 
5.3 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I presented the theoretical framework that will be the basis for the analysis. 
First I revisited the research question and my rationale for studying the subject. Next, a model 
illustrating the relationship between policy windows, problem definition, and microfinance 
was presented and discussed.  Finally I presented an overview of the research design. Here I 
discussed the choices informing the design including case selection, as well as the data 
collection methods. Strengths, potential weaknesses, and how my study places itself in the 
broader context were all discussed. We will now turn to the analysis of the three cases. 
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6 Empirical Analysis 
 
Let us review the core elements of my framework. The premise underlying my approach is 
that microfinance initiatives cannot emerge and become successful on a larger scale 
independent of state support. Drawing on the two theories presented in Chapter 4, support for 
microfinance is in turn dependent upon the following:  
A) The opening of policy windows;  
B) The problem definition and framing of microfinance.  
This chapter will attempt to explain how the variables chosen have affected the political 
support for microfinance initiatives. Each of the two main independent variables will be 
discussed in a separate section, and each section will discuss the two underlying factors.  
6.1 Political support for microfinance 
From our discussion of microfinance sustainability in Chapter 3, we know that in Western 
economies microfinance initiatives are largely unable to sustain themselves solely based on 
their economic activity. Not only is the target group poor and therefore unable to pay fees and 
interest, they also tend to suffer from low levels of financial literacy, which among other 
things increases delinquency rates. While the advantage of microfinance lies precisely in 
using innovative mechanisms such as group loans and stepped lending to address these issues, 
is not enough to mitigate the higher transaction costs from lending to the poor. An underlying 
premise is therefore that attention and support from policy makers is a key variable 
responsible for microfinance success.  
The sustainability premise is confirmed by several of my interviews. According to the 
informant at Microfinance Norway subsidies in one form or another were absolutely 
necessary. Given their focus on immigrants, and the services that MFN delivers, some form of 
subsidy was absolutely necessary. Even though the ambition was to become at least 
financially self-sustainable, the informant said that operational self-sustainability, which 
includes business development services and transaction costs, was not possible (Interview 
MFN 10:30).  
51 
 
The interview with MFN’s partner bank Cultura reveals the same tendency. The bank’s 
informant pointed out that although Cultura is a so-called social bank, meaning it is willing to 
provide funding and take risks where conventional banks will not, their microfinance 
portfolio was showing consistently poorer performance than other areas of their business. 
While 75% of each micro loan was covered by an EIF guarantee, and despite a handling 
subsidy of €200 per loan (Interview CB 35:00) the losses, which at times exceeded 10%, was 
beyond what the bank could afford (Interview CB 18:40, 23:00). For a small bank such as 
Cultura, even a mere five percent loss was described as unbearable in the longer run without 
greatly increasing interest rates (Interview CB 23:00).  
These findings echo findings from both Sweden and the UK. One organiser of a Swedish 
microfinance pilot observed that despite considerable interest in the products and services of 
the pilot, clients lacked knowledge on a wide range of areas from accounting to basic 
language training. The costs of providing basic training, let alone business development 
services far outmatched the level that the MFI could afford (Email, SP). Aspire, a UK CDFI 
reported that whereas they initially expected to cover all of their expenses through lending, 
the actual number was only ten percent (Forster, Lederman, Mayshak, & Mercer, 2006, p. 1)! 
Moreover, the MFI Street UK had to reduce its initial geographical scope from national to 
regional when faced with unexpectedly large costs associated with travelling between areas of 
operation (Copisarow, 2004, p. 8).  
Why were Cultura’s losses so high? Let us recall the theoretical discussion on adverse 
selection and transaction costs. Remember that the target segment of microfinance has often 
already been rejected by conventional banks. This means it is more likely that the bank will 
adversely select “bad” borrowers that are more likely to default or be delayed in their 
repayment. If the bank or MFI subsequently needs to spend a large amount of time providing 
free training, meeting face to face with clients, reporting of portfolio performance, or ensuring 
clients repay on time, sustainability becomes a serious problem. In fact towards the end of the 
2000s MFN experienced organisational difficulties that made the client follow up difficult. 
The bank informant explained that in the absence of MFN they simply did not have the 
capacity to provide the necessary follow up, which in turn increased delinquency rates 
(Interview CB 9:30). Moreover, strict EIF reporting standards combined with the informal 
character that is associated with projects financed by microfinance loans contributed to 
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increase the transaction costs on the part of the bank (Interview CB 7:45, 11:35). All of these 
factors contributed to raising the transaction costs beyond sustainability.6 
Having established that microfinance is dependent upon government sources, let us now turn 
to the policy variables. Which issues that receives government attention, let alone government 
resources, is not a straightforward question. The following discussion will attempt to provide 
an answer.  
6.1.1 The policy window variable 
The opening up of policy windows is crucial for the establishing microfinance initiatives. 
While microfinance initiatives existed in all three countries prior to political involvement, 
these were scattered and on a small scale. The introduction of the initiatives on a larger 
systematic scale occurred only as a direct result of government support. In all three cases we 
can trace this support back to catalytic events, policy windows that paved the way for 
microfinance. Microfinance is in and by itself no obvious answer to a certain policy problem, 
such as poverty; it is rather the successful coupling of microfinance to these issues that have 
been the key for its introduction. The following discussion will map out the role of the policy 
window in each of the three cases. 
The Norwegian experience 
The introduction of a publicly supported microfinance initiative in Norway can be traced back 
to a policy window opened in the wake of the 1997 general election and government 
reshuffle. The turnovers brought in a new leadership eager to prove their ability to implement 
policy. The new government also came into power with an intention to address the neglect of 
women’s issues in regional policy that had existed since the early 1990s. This coupling of the 
problem stream and the political stream opened up a policy window. This led to policy 
entrepreneurs advocating microfinance being able to seize the opportunities and couple 
microfinance as an alternative to various policy problems. 
In October 1996 long-time Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland decided to relinquish 
leadership of the Labour Party. Thorbjørn Jagland was chosen to replace her and form a new 
government of his own. Eager to prove himself, Jagland took office launching his flagship 
                                                
6 In this case we can think of business development services as a kind of bargaining and decision cost. 
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policy, called the ‘Norwegian House’ (Statsministerens kontor, 2006). Jagland was concerned 
with adapting to new times, to technology, and globalisation (Norderval, 2014), and in his 
inaugural speech Jagland emphasised the importance of a “broad dialogue about how the 
country should be run” advocating the creation of committees across a range of policy areas, 
“…composed of persons of high competence recruited from across the spectrum of society”. 
The election is a clear indicator of a change in the political stream. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that Norwegian microfinance initiatives had existed ever since 1992, 
albeit on a smaller scale. There was actually government interest early on in the approach: in 
the wake of the Lofoten pilot an interdepartmental committee had been working on the 
prospects of using microfinance in Norway. The outcome of this process was “Kvinnebanken 
Norgesnett,” or the Women’s Bank, a private non-profit created in 1996 to act as an umbrella 
organisation for the small, scattered groups across the country (Landbruksdepartementet, 
1996). Jagland later said that “the network associated with the Women’s Bank are one of the 
grassroots initiatives from below that I emphasise in the construction of the Norwegian 
House” (Width, 2010, p. 129). While the Women’s Bank was a grass roots initiative where 
the government only played an advisory role and provided limited funding, it nevertheless 
represents the first attempt of consolidation of grass roots knowledge of microfinance built up 
across the country since the early 1990s. 
What was the fuzz about? The early pilots and the Women’s Bank were all attempts to 
address the situation of women living in rural districts. According to Pettersen et. al (2000, p. 
21) women’s focus had entered regional policy in the mid-1980s but during the years 1993-97 
there had been a gradual reduction on funds and efforts on the matter. By the time the new 
government took place this criticism had become vocal. Women’s issues were therefore in the 
forefront of the problems stream.  
These changes in the political and problem streams caused a policy window to open. When 
the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD) in April 1997 
published the white paper on regional policy there was a therefore renewed women’s focus, 
and microfinance was an important aspect of this.  The inclusion of microfinance, however, 
was not a part of the government’s original proposition. According to a key informant, up 
until a week before the publication the white paper completely lacked any measures on 
women’s issues in regional policy (Interview GN). When this was pointed out, the Ministry 
realised the potential embarrassment for the government. In a stroke of fate, however, one of 
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the people involved in the process with the white paper had also been closely involved in the 
work with the Women’s Bank. This person therefore suggested microfinance as a possible 
measure to include (Interview GN) and, in the span of days a completely new measure had 
been included in the Ministry’s portfolio of measures. 
The almost accidental process illustrates the importance of policy entrepreneurs, and their 
ability to rapidly couple issues to issues on the government agenda: despite having no 
knowledge about microfinance, the need of the new Ministry to prove itself as well as 
avoiding a potential embarrassing situation made the coupling successful. This policy proved 
to be the entry point from which microfinance transformed from a purely grass roots initiative 
supported by government into an official policy tool.  
Let us move forward in time. Although it is too early to conclude, change in 2013 can also 
possibly be defined as another policy window opening up. Towards the end of the 2000s 
microfinance in Norway had come to a halt. In 2008 Innovation Norway (formerly NIRDF) 
chose to discontinue microfinance as a part of their portfolio. At the same time MFN was 
struggling with lack of funding and organisational troubles. Over the last few years, MFN had 
been financed in large part by NAV’s so-called “poverty money,” as well as a support scheme 
for social entrepreneurs.7  
Parallel with this development there has been a growing awareness of social entrepreneurship 
in Norway. Ferd, a private investment fund has been a key actor, arranging annual 
conferences bringing together actors from state, private, and voluntary sector. In 2012 the 
consultancy firm DAMVAD undertook an extensive study of social entrepreneurship in 
Norway, the first of its kind (DAMVAD, 2012). In 2013, the Nordic Council initiated a study 
on social entrepreneurship led by the Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet, 2014c).  
Moreover, In 2013 the Centre-Left coalition was defeated by a new coalition consisting of the 
Conservatives and the Progress party, supported by the Liberals. The government quickly 
signaled a positive attitude towards the third sector and social entrepreneurship. Indeed, 
Robert Eriksson from the Progress Party – a populist party traditionally opposed to high 
government spending – was appointed Minster of Labour and Social Inclusion. Eriksson has 
on several occasions voiced his support for social entrepreneurship (see e.g. Arbeids- og 
                                                
7 According to several of my informants, this scheme was lobbied by the social entrepreneurs themselves 
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sosialdepartementet, 2014a; Haugan, 2014),and in spring 2014 invited social economy actors 
to a dialogue meeting with the government concerning funding social entrepreneurship 
(Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet, 2014b). The informant at MFN explained that over the last 
year the number of inquiries by government agencies has risen dramatically, as the new 
leadership looks for input new ways to (Interview MFN 46:38). Financially the new 
government has strengthened this support scheme considerably and plans to further strengthen 
it in the future (Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet, 2014a).  
We see that the last few years’ developments indicate that social entrepreneurship is emerging 
as a serious policy alternative within the policy stream. Moreover, the election of the new 
government has brought about a change in the political stream. While it is too soon to 
determine the outcome of the current processes, there are signs that a current policy window 
might open. According to Kingdon, however, policy windows also require a change in the 
problem stream. Unlike in 1997, there is currently no clear problem that microfinance can 
attach to. The new government has emphasised social entrepreneurship as an alternative to 
costly public welfare. While this evokes the problem of welfare state sustainability that is 
currently affecting many European states, it is probably less relevant in Norway. 
The UK experience 
Like in Norway, the introduction of microfinance can be traced back to a policy window 
opened in the wake of the 1997 election. ‘New’ Labour entered government with a clear 
ambition of addressing the growing gap between the rich and the poor in the UK. The 
government also intended to do this using new and innovative ideas about the third sector and 
the social economy, and by reaching out to actors across the spectrum of society. Thus, the 
policy window created allowed policy entrepreneurs promoting finance to impact the policy 
agenda, leading to the introduction of microfinance.  
When Tony Blair was elected in 1997 his promise was to end the growing class divisions in 
Britain, to “bring Britain back together.” Many of the “old Labour” policies of government 
intervention, however, had long been discredited and by many considered the reason for the 
party’s long streak of poor elections (Kendall, 2000, pp. 14–16). When ‘New’ Labour was 
elected it was therefore promising a new approach, unlike both the Conservatives and ‘old’ 
Labour. For example, the election manifesto stated that “New Labour will be wise spenders, 
not big spenders. We will work in partnership with the private sector to achieve our goals” 
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(The Labour Party, 1997). Blair promised to strengthen regional economic opportunities 
through the creation of Regional Development Agencies, and to tackle unemployment 
through “New partnerships between government and business, fully involving local 
authorities and the voluntary sector, [in order to] attack long-term joblessness” (The Labour 
Party, 1997).  
Preceding the election were also developments in the policy stream. Most notably, a 1996 
report by the independent Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector spelled out 
many of the proposals and ideas that would find their way to the New Labour manifesto. The 
report called for the authorities to recognise, formalise, and strengthen the role of voluntary 
and community organisations, calling for a “concordat” to be written between the third sector 
and the government (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2006). The influence of the report is clear: 
in 1998 the so-called “Compact” between New Labour and the third sector was presented, 
echoing the 1996 report, and established goals concerning independence of the sector, aspects 
of funding, and the terms of cooperation between the state and the sector (see Zimmeck, 
Rochester, & Rushbrooke, 2011, pp. 138–155 for original compact). The election victory 
therefore enabled the coupling of the political and policy streams. 
One of the first acts undertaken by the new government in 1997 was to set up the so-called 
Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). The same year as the Compact was signed SEU presented 
Bringing Britain Together: a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. The report was 
the flagship of the Labour’s efforts, promising to close the gap between the poorest 
neighbourhoods and the rest of the country through “investing in people… involving 
communities… making a long term commitment” along with a host of other goals (Social 
Exclusion Unit, 1998). 
The NSNR shows the government’s intention cooperate with the third sector. It consisted of 
eighteen Policy Action Teams (PATs) covering a range of issues, from housing, to crime, to 
financial inclusion. Rather than simply civil servants, the PATs involved a range of actors 
from across the spectrum of society, such as private business, the voluntary sector, and 
government. Suddenly advocates and policy entrepreneurs of all kinds were able directly 
influence the agenda. Indeed, “PAT 3 – Business” included champions of community finance 
Ed Mayo of the New Economics Foundations and Richard Street of The Prince’s Youth 
Business Trust, one of the early microfinance initiatives (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p. 
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253). Indeed, it was PAT 3 that eventually recommended the implementation of a government 
policy in microfinance. 
The NSNR introduced two policies supporting microfinance: first, the £98 million Phoenix 
Fund providing capital to MFIs; and second, the Community Interest Tax Relief (CITR), a tax 
exemption especially targeting CDFIs and recognising their social utilities along purely 
financial ones. Along with other institutions providing financial services to poor communities 
such as credit unions, MFIs were branded as Community Interest Financial Institutions 
(CDFIs).  
I argue that the 1997 election shows all the ingredients for a policy window to open up. First, 
the UK faced a problem of growing class divisions and community deprivation. Second, the 
election represented a change in the political stream with a new government open to new 
approaches. Third, developments in the policy stream meant that third sector alternatives were 
moving to the forefront of the agenda. Combined with institutional structures encouraging 
external involvement, such as the PATs, this provided the ideal opportunity for coupling of 
microfinance with Labour’s policy agenda. 
Like Norway, the UK provides a second example of how policy windows have facilitated 
political support for microfinance initiatives. By the late 2000s, the CDFI sector was 
stagnating under an increasingly unstable funding situation and little growth in loan numbers 
(CDFA, 2014b see also figure 5 below). Then two significant events turned things around. 
First was international financial crisis that was affecting economies across the world, 
including Britain. The crisis led to a substantial increase in demand for CDFI loans, as main 
street banks tightened lending policies for SMEs and individuals (CDFA, 2009, p. 2). 
Moreover, the adverse effects of the financial crisis, especially with respect to SMEs and 
employment, prompted the government to launch the Enterprise Finance Guarantee, providing 
guarantees up to 75% of loans to small businesses, including CDFIs to stabilise the funding 
situation (CDFA, n.d.). This not only helped CDFIs survive themselves, it also helped them 
serve their new clients. 
The second event was again a government turnover. In 2010 Labour was replaced in by a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government led by Prime Minister David Cameron. 
Cameron sought to shake things up: the Conservative election manifesto was a marked 
departure from that of Labour, emphasising deficit reduction, tax cuts, and other ‘blue’ 
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policies. The emphasis was on small business creation and financing, and education and 
skills; not to “bring Britain together, but rather “so the next generation can succeed in the 
global race” (Conservative Party, 2010, p. 5, n.d.). Considering the “social” profile of the 
efforts to foster the third sector under Blair the turnover did not bode well for CDFI industry. 
Cameron opened his tenure by shaking up initiatives that had been central in fostering the 
CDFI industry. The Regional Development Agencies were replaced with the new Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). Moreover, the Office of the Third Sector as well as SEU’s 
successor, the Social Exclusion Task Force was swallowed by the new Office of the Civil 
Society (Helm & Asthana, 2010).  
What the Conservatives took with one hand, they nevertheless gave back with the other. First, 
the Enterprise Finance Guarantee was reformed and improved to specifically aid CDFIs 
(CDFA, n.d.). Second, the £3.2 billion Regional Growth Fund was created, intended to 
promote private sector in areas most at risk of public sector cuts and create sustainable jobs 
(Government, 2012). Third the New Enterprise Allowance scheme (NEA) and the Start-up 
Loan Scheme (SUL) was launched, designed to help unemployed wanting to start their own 
enterprise (Daily Mail Reporter, 2010).8 And fourth, the government launched the so-called 
Big Society Bank, the world’s first wholesale bank explicitly devoted to social investment and 
funding the third sector. Interestingly, Big Society Bank was chaired by Ronald Cohen, 
former chair of the Social Investment Task Force and one of the chief advocates of CDFIs 
(CDFA, 2012). From 2011 and onwards the CDFI sector has seen substantial growth, from 
around 1000-1500 to over 9000 loans. 82% of the new business loans made were made 
through the NEA and SUL programmes (CDFA, 2014b, p. 20). Below are two figures 
detailing the growth in loans by number and value. 
                                                
8 The NEA was interestingly a reintroduction of the Enterprise Allowance Scheme first introduced by Thatcher 
in 1981 
59 
 
 
Figure 6.1: CDFI business loan growth by number. Taken directly from (CDFA 2014 p. 19) 
 
Figure 6.2: CDFI business loan growth by value. Taken directly from (CDFA 2014 p. 19) 
The figure shows the spike in loan numbers and value that came in the wake of the financial 
crisis and the introduction of the EFG in 2009. This effect, however, seems short-lived. Next 
there is a rapid growth occurring after 2011, with the introduction of the NEA and SUL 
programs. 
Let me sum up the second example. First, the election marks a change in the political stream. 
The election in turn caused a change in the policy stream, with a renewed focus on business 
policy and SMEs. Cameron also embraced the Big Society Bank, which had floated around in 
the policy stream of several years. Moreover, the financial crisis brought a change in the 
problems stream. The immediate effects of attempts of mitigating the crisis is seen in Figure 5 
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and 6 above, but the crisis also affected the rhetoric of the Cameron government that took 
office in 2010. This resulted in a series of new policies that directly or indirectly benefited the 
CDFI industry. The link between policies and CDFIs is less explicit than in 1997: the NEA, 
SUL, and other measures were general in nature, rather than policies directly targeting CDFIs. 
Nor is the role played by policy entrepreneurs as clear, with the possible exception of Big 
Society Bank. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the policy window helped reinvigorate 
political support for microfinance in the UK. 
The Swedish experience 
The contribution of policy windows for the introduction of microfinance in Sweden is less 
clear. Swedish microfinance initiatives were not introduced on the background of a general 
election or government turnover, but rather on the back of a series of developments that 
occurred throughout the 1990s. I identify changes in the problem stream as well as the policy 
stream, but I am not able to identify changes in the political stream, nor the role played by 
policy entrepreneurs. 
The developments leading up to the introduction of microfinance started in the early 1990s. In 
1990 Sweden experienced a considerable economic downturn. Excessive government deficits 
forced incumbent right-wing government led by Carl Bildt to slashing public expenditures 
and scaling back on measures fostering regional development. This in turn exacerbated an 
already existing pattern of rural depopulation and deindustrialisation that was occurring 
across Europe at the same time. The result was a policy vacuum emerging throughout the 
1990s (NUTEK, 2001, pp. 17–18).  
The recession and depopulation paved the way for Swedish EU membership. Membership in 
the Union in turn opened up access to the European structural funds. The structural fund and 
its programs are part of EU’s regional policy intended to narrow the regional disparities in 
Europe (European Commission, n.d.). programs would eventually become models on which 
the new Swedish regional policy was based (Regeringen, 2001, p. 78). The structural funds 
would also play an important role in the establishment of grass roots microfinance initiatives, 
through programs such as EQUAL.  
Towards the late 1990s the pendulum swung back: starting 1998 the newly reelected social 
democrat government led by Göran Persson launched a series of policy propositions on 
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regional policy starting with the “Regional Growth – for work and welfare.” The proposition 
highlighted the difficulty of securing financing for SMEs, and among the measures included 
was easing the process of establishing and running small enterprises as well as increasing the 
supply of capital to young entrepreneurs (Regeringen, 1998, p. 89). Finally, in a proposition 
from 2001 the first explicit policy initiative on microfinance was passed when government 
proposed a system of “micro loans” should be created, administrated by ALMI (Regeringen, 
2001, p. 173).  
Although it seems clear that these events have contributed to the introduction of microfinance, 
it is probably too bold to claim there was a policy window present like in the other cases. 
According to Kingdon, policy windows only stay open for shorter periods of time (Kingdon, 
2014, p. 169). While it could be claimed that the magnitude of the economic and political 
transition that were undertaken kept the a window open for longer, the introduction of the 
micro loan should rather be seen as the culmination of a more drawn out process, where 
several problems emerges on the agenda over time. The economic crisis and vacuum on 
regional policy represents concrete changes in the problem stream. These were problems that 
spurred EU membership, along with several policy initiatives dealing with regional and 
economic policy. With respect to the policy stream there are also indicators: during the years 
leading up to the introduction of the micro loan, several parliamentary proposals, most of 
them from the Liberal People’s Party, proposed the creation of a Swedish microfinance 
initiative run by ALMI (see e.g. Riksdagen, 1998, 1999). While policy windows or favourable 
changes in the political stream are not necessary to implement new policies, their absence 
seems to slow down the process. 
The strengthening of ALMIs mini loan represents a more clear-cut example of a policy 
window strengthening political support for microfinance. In 2009 the ceiling of the loan was 
raised from SEK 100,000 to SEK 250,000, the requirement of collateral removed, and the 
loan rebranded into a “micro loan.” This was preceded by a change in the political stream: in 
2006 Perssons Social Democrat government was replaced by a right wing coalition led by 
Fredrik Reinfeldt from the party Alliance for Sweden. The new government’s platform 
included among other measures cutting red tape and easing the financial situation for SMEs. 
In late 2007 a committee of enquiry was set down tasked with evaluating existing financial 
support measures on behalf of the new government (Näringsdepartementet, 2007). Among the 
recommendations presented in the resulting report was improving the terms of the mini loan 
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through increasing the ceiling and removing the need for collateral 
(Företagsfinansieringsutredningen, 2008, p. 67). Simultaneously two other reports, one by the 
Ministry for Agriculture and the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
(SAERG) argued the same (Landsbygdsdepartementet, 2008, p. 15; NUTEK, 2007, p. 56). 
This shows that microfinance was also present in the policy stream.   
Finally, the 2009 Financial Crisis that hit the world between 2007 and 2009 represents a 
change in the problem stream. In the wake of the crisis ALMI saw a large increase in 
applications for the mini loan as credit conditions tightened. New loans made increased by 
88%, while the total capital lent out increased by 42%, much of it presenting demand for the 
mini loan (Finansdepartementet, 2013, p. 639).  
It is clear that a policy window preceded the strengthening of the microfinance initiative. 
First, Reinfeld’s new government came into power with a strong emphasis on SMEs and 
entrepreneurship. Second, the series of proposals advocating strengthening the microfinance 
initiative shows the support amongst policymakers. Third, the financial crisis contributed to 
opening a policy window that expedited these proposals to the forefront of the decision 
agenda. Although I have not been able to identify any influence by policy entrepreneurs, the 
joining of the three streams nevertheless provided sufficient to ensure political support for 
microfinance. 
Summary of the policy window variable  
Let me sum up the policy variable. I argue that the empirical analysis supports the assumption 
about the importance of policy windows for political support of microfinance initiatives. 
According to Kingdon the policy window opens during changes in the problem and political 
streams. The joining of the three streams increases the chance of a policy proposal being 
successful. Let me therefore summarise the three streams in the three countries.  
First, microfinance is more likely to emerge because of changes in the problems stream. In 
Norway, the problem was women’s entrepreneurship and depopulation of rural areas. In 
addition a more acute problem was the lack of women’s measures in the new government’s 
regional policy. In the UK, the problem was the growing disparities and community 
deprivation. Later on, the problem was the effects of the financial crisis. In Sweden, the 
problem was the 1990s economic crisis and its effect on rural development. Later on, the 
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problem was the effects of the global financial crisis. The crisis saw demand for microfinance 
increase in both Sweden and the UK. Incidentally, the financial crisis coincided with the 
demise of microfinance in Norway, possibly due to the lower impact of the crisis on the 
economy relative to the other two countries. The problems, some sudden and others more 
prolonged, shaped the attention of policymakers and encouraged microfinance as a possible 
“fix.”  
Second, microfinance is more likely to emerge in the wake of changes in the political stream, 
most notably because of government turnovers. A government turnover preceded the 
introduction of microfinance in Norway in 1998. It also preceded the renewed strengthening 
of social entrepreneurship, although it is too early to say whether this will affect microfinance. 
A turnover preceded the introduction of microfinance in the UK in 1998, as well as the 
renewed growth in 2011-2012. And, a turnover preceded the strengthening of ALMI’s loan in 
Sweden in 2009. There was also an election preceding the introduction of the original mini 
loan in Sweden in 2001, although I cannot conclude that this played a key facilitating role. I 
argue that this pattern was not a coincidence: the turnovers brought in new leadership 
interested in new approaches and eager to implement policies. 
Third, microfinance is more likely to emerge in the wake of changes in the policy stream, 
although the tendency is less clear. In Norway, there were tendencies of women’s and 
regional issues moving to the forefront of the policy stream preceding the 1998 introduction. 
Similarly we see the issue of social entrepreneurship emerging around 2011. In the UK, the 
concept of the third sector emerged in the policy stream prior to the 1998 introduction. In 
Sweden, microfinance had floated around in proposals prior to the introduction in 2001. 
Moreover, strengthening the loan had been suggested in several reports prior to the 2009 
decision. While systematic impact of changes in the policy stream is less clear, we 
nevertheless see several examples of how pre-existing policies have entered the decision 
agenda of governments prior to the introduction of microfinance initiatives. 
I identify four policy windows that have catalysed political support for microfinance. The fact 
that these widows appear and behave in a similar fashion across all three indicates that policy 
windows indeed have been important. 
1. Preceding the introduction of microfinance in Norway in 1998 
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2. Preceding the introduction of microfinance in the UK in 1998 
3. Preceding the strengthening of microfinance in Sweden in 2009 
4. Preceding the strengthening of microfinance in the UK ca. 2010 
The current process surrounding social entrepreneurship that is ongoing in Norway could 
possibly be identified as another policy window, although it is too early to conclude. Finally, 
there are signs of a policy window preceding the introduction of microfinance in Sweden in 
2001, but I have not found enough evidence to conclude. Now I move to the next variable 
where I attempt to delve deeper into the problems stream and the various problem definitions 
that influence political support for microfinance. 
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Figure 6.3: Time line over developments in the three countries 1990-2013 
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6.1.2 The problem definition variable 
We see how policy windows are important for setting the stage for coupling of microfinance 
and the government agenda. If policy window variable explains how, the problem definition 
variable therefore tries to explain why, and perhaps just as important, why not. Policies are 
responses to problems that presents themselves to policymakers (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993, p. 
56). We saw in chapter 4 that specification of a problem is not straightforward.9 The various 
ways problems, target groups, and solutions are defined affect the political support for these 
problems, groups, and solutions.  
I identify five problem definitions that have all been central to the developments in the three 
countries. These are poverty and community deprivation; gender and ethnic issues; regional 
policy; access to capital for SMEs and entrepreneurs, and welfare state alternative. If we 
combine these with the social and entrepreneurial distinction, the first three belongs to the 
social category, while the latter two belong to the entrepreneurial category. The last one, 
welfare state alternative, is perhaps best considered a hybrid. 
I find that social forms of microfinance tend to be given less support than entrepreneurial. In 
both Norway and Sweden social approaches to microfinance have struggled with low funding 
and low interest. In the case of Norway, this approach eventually led to tensions that affected 
political support, as policymakers over time gravitated towards a more entrepreneurial 
approach while the microfinance initiative did not.  In Sweden, there was no similar explicit 
connection between microfinance and the social problem definition  
While the UK do not have the same strong distinction between social and entrepreneurial 
microfinance as in Norway and Sweden, we can also here see the tendency of moving from 
social towards more entrepreneurial microfinance in the UK. The negative impact of social 
microfinance is nevertheless mitigated by the problem definition of microfinance-as-welfare-
alternative, which creates scope for more social approaches as well. 
The Norwegian Experience 
                                                
9 See section 4.3.2 Table 3: An anatomy of problem description 
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Following the “schism” that has existed between microfinance initiatives in Norway10 I have 
separated the discussion according between the grass roots and the official microfinance 
initiatives. I begin by discussing the official microfinance initiative. My finding argument is 
that a change in IN’s definition of the problem from one of gender equality into one of 
entrepreneurship contributed to the demise of its microfinance initiative. At the same time the 
rationales, structures, and procedures of the microfinance initiative remained firmly 
embedded in the same definition of the problem as one of gender. Thus microfinance was no 
longer seen as a proper solution and therefore cut. 
The 1997 white paper on regional policy provided the entry point for microfinance. We have 
seen how the election of Jagland in 1997 caused renewed interest in regional- and gender 
policy. Like Sweden, Norway had experienced the deindustrialisation and subsequent 
depopulation of rural districts that occurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1997 
white paper, the government promised to introduce targeted measures to maintain settlement 
patterns and ensure employment and welfare in rural areas experiencing population decline 
(Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 1997, sec. 1.5). Women’s issues were also given an 
important role in the white paper. The white paper based its rationale on a 1996 report 
criticising the declining priority of women’s measures in regional policy. Moreover, it was 
argued that prioritising women was crucial in order to correct the skewed gender balance in 
the districts. Making women stay would in turn make young families stay, which in turn help 
the government reach its goals of maintaining settlement patterns (Kommunal- og 
arbeidsdepartementet, 1997, sec. 7.1).  
Microfinance was introduced as a part of a new collection of programs called “Women in 
Focus” organised under NIRDF. After a phase of initial excitement the process nevertheless 
slowed down. According to one informant NIRDF lacked both competence and interest in the 
matter, but nevertheless decided to exclude the Women’s Bank, the main source of 
knowledge and best practices on microfinance that had been built up by the 1990s pilots 
(Interview GN). Indeed, Pettersen et. al. reports considerable confusion and disagreement 
inside NIRDF of what women’s issues in fact entailed. Some even argued that it broke with 
the principle of equality of treatment embedded in NIRDF and was therefore inappropriate 
(Pettersen et al., 2000, pp. 60–61). We therefore early on see the tensions between the social 
focus of the microfinance initiative and the priorities of NIRDF. 
                                                
10 See chapter two 
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While the early troubles delayed implementation for a year, the next couple of years saw the 
program running relatively smoothly. Politically, there was broad support: in a 2003 comment 
from the Standing Committee of Business and Industry on the creation of NIRDFs successor 
IN, representatives from all parties but the Progress Party supported sustaining and 
strengthening “Women in Focus” (Næringskomiteen, 2003, p. 4). Moreover, in 2008 when 
the government presented its White Paper on entrepreneurship among women, microfinance 
figured prominently, as a measure to be continued and strengthened (Nærings- og 
Handelsdepartementet, 2008, p. 26).11  
Within IN there was nonetheless growing dissatisfaction with the initiative. According to IN’s 
informant the cost of monitoring the microfinance groups outweighed the benefits: without 
any coordination the network groups fell apart, and considerable resources had to be used on 
monitoring and follow-up. Attempts of improving organisation produced only temporary 
results (Interview IN 09:35). A 2008 National Auditor evaluation also revealed dissatisfaction 
with the niche-programs, such as those targeting women and youth. According to IN staff, 
these programs were sub-optimal and cumbersome to administrate, and some argued they 
should be removed (Riksrevisjonen, 2008, p. 55). 
Simultaneously to these developments the informant stated that IN slowly changed their 
priorities this change occurred as a gradual change in NIRDF’s priorities, from quantity of 
businesses created, to quality. In the words of the informant, “we now have a very strong 
focus on growth and survival, especially growth. This is IN’s new strategy” (Interview IN 
19:20). While its predecessor NIRDF was tasked a range of policy goals including 
maintaining employment, patterns of settlement as well as protecting industries in rural 
districts, Innovation Norway, as the name implies, was to promote an increasing focus on 
innovation, modernisation, and competitiveness among Norwegian businesses (see 
Landbruksdepartementet, 1999, p. 15; Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet, 2003, p. 6). 
The shift was probably also influenced by the increasing criticism that IN faced in the media 
and academia. Already in 2004 a report criticised IN for launching small and short-term 
women’s measures attempting to solve problems that were structural or long-term in scope, 
calling these rent-seeking (Teigen, 2003, p. 7). The above mentioned National Auditor 
evaluation moreover argued that most of IN’s funds were spent on non-innovative projects, 
                                                
11 According to informants, the inclusion was primarily caused by considerable lobbying efforts by key activists 
from the microfinance community 
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that programs were confusing and complicated; and that the international focus was weak 
(Riksrevisjonen, 2008, pp. 8–12). Combined with the sentiments that existed internally in IN, 
this likely sped up the transformation of priorities, away from targeted measures towards 
more universalistic ones, and from “social” to more “entrepreneurial” measures. 
In 2008 IN decided to discontinue microfinance as a measure. In doing this, they ignored a 
2008 evaluation by Rambøll (see Rambøll Management Consulting, 2008) advocating the 
continuation of the initiative, as well as the recommendations in the government white paper 
on women’s entrepreneurship. A short-lived replacement, so-called Gründer groups, was 
introduced as a replacement serving the same target group, but without the loan capital. A 
2010 evaluation of IN illustrates the culmination of this process, recommending that IN’s 
women’s efforts be reassigned from a primary consideration, that is, a priority that deserve its 
own discrete program, to a so-called “cross-cutting secondary consideration” meaning that 
women’s issues should instead permeate as a priority throughout other IN programs.  
I argue that the change in priorities affected microfinance negatively. The demise of the 
initiative can certainly be partially explained by its mixed performance. But part of the reason 
can be found in IN’s reorientation of focus. The problems that microfinance originally was 
supposed to fix were more “social” in nature, such as unemployment, gender equality, and 
maintaining rural settlement. By the end of the decade the problems were considerably more 
“entrepreneurial,” focusing on measures such as innovation, growth, and internationalisation. 
Moreover, the external criticisms faced by IN likely contributed to this development. At the 
same time microfinance initiative stayed firmly anchored in “Grameen-style” definition of 
microfinance as a tool targeting women, and revolving around the group as a social arena for 
borrowing, networking, and sharing experiences. With respect to the three aspects of problem 
definition, we see that the problem definition change, the definition of the target group and 
solution stayed the same. The resulting conflict had a negative impact of political support for 
microfinance.12 
Let us now turn to the grass roots microfinance initiative. The story of Microfinance Norway 
illustrates another aspect of how problem definition shaped political support towards 
microfinance. The story of MFN is one of lack of official interest and a constant struggle of 
                                                
12 It is important to recall that I do not refer to political support strictly as support for politicians. We saw above 
that politicians were supportive of microfinance, but that this did not matter much as bureaucracy was against. 
See discussion in chapter five. 
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attracting funds. I argue that the approach to welfare provision advocated by MFN competed 
with that of the government, where the former has promoted self-employment and 
microfinance, whereas the latter has preferred either labour or existing welfare provisions. 
Over the last few years, however, we see signs of change. With the emergence of social 
entrepreneurship as a concept and the new Solberg government there is a reconceptualisation 
of the problem as one of welfare state sustainability. 
As described in Chapter 2, MFN, or Network Credit Norway as it used to be called, grew out 
of the microfinance project conducted by the Norwegian People’s Aid. For MFN, the 
emphasis on the “social” aspect of microfinance over the “entrepreneurial” was even more 
pronounced. The target consisted primarily of immigrants, often women with a weak 
attachment to the labour market, and as opposed to creating innovative businesses with 
growth potential, the goal of MFN’s clients was rather to secure some form of self-
employment, empowerment, and to get the clients off welfare. 
When NIRDF launched its microfinance initiative in 1998, MFN applied for money. 
According to the informant at MFN, they were immediately met with resistance within 
NIRDF, who wanted to prioritise groups in the districts. The informant claims that there was a 
belief that immigrants, the main target group of MFN, were unsuited for starting their own 
business (Interview MFN 5:00). Funding was eventually granted after a supportive 
coordinator at the local NIRDF office in Oslo overruled the central administration (Interview 
GN).  
The money from NIRDF was nevertheless only a one off sum. The lack of stability has been 
the single biggest impediment for operating the microfinance initiative and over the course of 
the 2000s MFN went through a host of sources of finances, from the Trondheim municipal 
government and Hordaland county council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD), and even private donors (Interview 
MFN 01:20-09:10). Common for all of them was that funds were granted on a one-off or 
short-term basis.  
Moreover, funds granted sometimes also had strict requirements attached. In 2005 MFN won 
a bid for a pilot contract on integration of third-country nationals within the EU, personally 
initiated by minister Erna Solberg and jointly financed by the Ministry of Local Government 
and Regional Development (MLGRD) and the EU (Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet, 
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2005). According to MFN the pilot was successful and managed to deliver considerable 
results given the limited funding. These results nevertheless did not satisfy the Ministry, 
which according to the informant demanded research of a scale and scope that MFN was in no 
position to deliver (Interview MFN 12:00).  
Three sources of funds have proved somewhat stable. First, the guarantee facility extended to 
Cultura and MFN by the European Investment Fund, providing a guarantee of 75% of 
eventual losses; 13 Second, the so-called “poverty money,” provided by NAV starting 2009 to 
support voluntary organisations working for the poor and socially excluded. While technically 
is not a voluntary organisation, the authorities decided to extend the scheme on the ground of 
the unique service MFN provided; and third the money supporting social entrepreneurship, 
also offered by NAV since 2011.  
The picture painted is first and foremost one of official disinterest. When funding has been 
granted it seems to have been patchy and based on personal involvement from politicians and 
administrators. This tendency may explain why the MLGRD switched from supportive to 
hostile towards MFN when Erna Solberg left after the election defeat of 2006. The disinterest 
in MFN in particular may reflect a general disinterest in entrepreneurship as a means for 
employment amongst immigrants, as opposed to traditional programs of work training for the 
regular labour market. We have already seen how IN’s focus gradually changed. A 2008 
evaluation of two business development centres for immigrants illustrate this: Out of 122 
course participants 22 applied for capital, either from IN, banks, or the city, and only one 
person was approved. Immigrants told stories of having to attend numerous courses only to be 
rejected when the question of accessing capital came up (Enehaug, Gamperiene, & Osman, 
2009, p. 122). It seems that immigrants do not fit into the government’s definition of potential 
entrepreneurs; for this population the solution is either conventional labour or welfare. 
Over the course of the last few years there are signs of a new definition of the problem 
emerging. The rise of the concept of social entrepreneurship brings with it the idea of the 
limits to the traditional welfare state. Social entrepreneurship implies that the social goals can 
be met through market or hybrid approaches, thus challenging the hegemony of the welfare 
state in Norway. The new understanding therefore has the potential to cause a renewed 
interest in microfinance as a policy tool.  
                                                
13 Technically this was a guarantee agreement rather than actual funds, but the effect –increased capital for 
lending – was the same. 
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The election of the Solberg government in 2013 accelerated this process. This is not a 
coincidence: We already know that the new Prime Minister Solberg is favourably disposed 
towards social entrepreneurship. Moreover, both the Conservatives and the Progress Party 
have traditionally been more sympathetic to non-state means of delivering welfare. In the 
words of the new Minister of Labour Robert Eriksson:  
The current welfare state must be overhauled to be sustainable in the future… we must allow 
voluntary and charitable organisations as well as private social entrepreneurs in our welfare production. 
We must move from a welfare state to a welfare society. (Haugan, 2014)  
Under this new problem conceptualisation “social” microfinance fits into public policy as the 
solution to a different problem: The problem is not necessarily low levels of entrepreneurship, 
or financial or social exclusion. Rather, it is a bloated and unsustainable welfare system. 
Under this definition, microfinance becomes a solution to a different problem: not to market 
failure, but to government failure.  
Perhaps this is one reason why MFN’s approach to microfinance has been ignored under 
previous governments? As the informant interviewed at NAV pointed out, social 
entrepreneurship challenges the principle of universality deeply embedded in the Nordic 
model. According to this informant one of the strengths of the Nordic model is that it relies 
less on means-testing and offers a reliable base safety net, rather than pushing unemployed 
into self-help strategies such as self-employment (Interview NAV, not recorded). The issue of 
microfinance in the context of social entrepreneurship raises ideological debates about the 
tension between the welfare state and employment and the role of microfinance.  
The UK experience 
The United Kingdom does not exhibit the same “schism” as we see in Norway, and I will 
therefore discuss it as one case. My main finding is that the UK case has been dominated by 
the definition of microfinance as means to address poverty and community deprivation. Hand 
in hand with this definition is also the idea of microfinance as an alternative – or “solution” – 
to public welfare. This definition has not only contributed to broad political support, it allows 
flexibility in the various forms of microfinance. We therefore see a larger range of 
implementations in the UK compared to for example Norway, where microfinance was 
explicitly tied to women as the target group.  
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In The UK, microfinance was implemented in the context of addressing poverty and 
deprivation in local communities. This problem definition is reflected in the acronym for 
MFIs in the UK: Community Development Financial Institutions. In the preamble of the 
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) it reads that the strategy was created 
in order to “develop integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst 
housing estates, including, crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, and bad 
schools etc.” (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p. 1). In the same document, Tony Blair states that 
“Our goal is simple: it is to bridge the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of 
Britain” (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p. 3). 
While women and minorities were given extra priority, microfinance were not restricted to 
these groups (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p. 49). Indeed, only a few CDFIs, such as the 
Norwich Full Circle Fund run by WEETU were exclusively targeting women. Moreover, the 
mainstreaming of microfinance has apparently not led to a disadvantage to women or ethnic 
minorities: although updated aggregate data does not exist, figures from the loans made under 
the Phoenix Fund between 2001 and 2005 show that out of 900 business loans issued, 40% 
were made to women, and 30% were made to ethnic minorities (GHK Consulting Ltd, 2004, 
p. 55). More recent data from the London CDFI East London Small Business Centre (2012, p. 
5) showed that 46% of loans agreed on went to women. ScotCash, another CDFI operating in 
Scotland, reported that in 2013 72% of their clients were women (Scotcash, 2013, p. 11). 
The British development must also be seen in conjunction to the emergence of the concept of 
the social economy, or the “third sector” as it is referred to in the UK.  Over the course of the 
1990s the third sector started to galvanise as a term. By the end of the 1980s The Labour 
Party was attempting to distance itself from what Kendall (2000, p. 15) describes as the “old 
dogma” of state-centrism. When Tony Blair assumed leadership of the party in 1994, this 
process only accelerated as Blair sought ways to embrace a more market-friendly approach 
while at the same time appealing to traditional Leftist values. When he entered power, Blair 
therefore wholeheartedly embraced the “Third way” as a means to distance “New” labour 
from the failed ways of the past, while at the same time rejecting the Tory dichotomy of state 
and the market. When New Labour was elected in 1997, the idea of the third sector was 
therefore heavily embedded in Blair’s rhetoric. As he states in the election manifesto:  
In each area of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that differs 
from the old left and the Conservative right. This is why new Labour is new. (The Labour Party, 1997). 
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It was also described in the discussion on the policy window variable how the government 
reached out to actors from both the private and the third sector. 
One consequence of this approach to microfinance is that whereas the Norwegian and 
Swedish sector can be divided into grassroots- and official initiatives, the UK sector has no 
such distinction. While the government provides funding, initiatives are all run by private 
CDFIs. 
The poverty/welfare-alternative definition of microfinance ensured sustained political support 
throughout the 2000s. A number of initiatives were launched, such as the Regional 
Development Agencies, the Phoenix Fund, the Social Investment Task Force, the Office of 
the Third Sector, and the Commission for Unclaimed Assets. Between 2000 and 2008 the 
government invested around £55 million into CDFIs (HM Treasury, 2008, p. 90). Of course, 
the CDFI sector was not immune to the ebb and flow of the policy cycle: for example, the 
Phoenix Fund closed down in 2005, with funding responsibility being delegated to the RDAs. 
But on the whole funding arrangements remained stable over time and gave the sector the 
predictability it needed to grow.  
The Coalition win in the 2010 election led to a move away from the poverty definition 
towards a greater focus on the entrepreneurial aspect of microfinance. We have seen earlier 
that the election saw many of the old measures created under Labour replaced by new 
measures more explicitly focused on businesses. There are signs that the increasing focus on 
competition affecting social microfinance negatively. For example, in 2013 the Norwich-
based Women’s Employment, Enterprise Training Unity, one of the oldest MFIs in the UK, 
and one of the few exclusively targeting women using group loans, were forced to close in the 
face of funding cuts (Woods, 2013). These tendencies are also a product of the increased 
focus on sustainability that occurred towards the second half of the decade.  
This shift from a socially oriented towards a more entrepreneurial focus should nevertheless 
not be overestimated. Already before the election the Social Investment Task Force noted that  
in the current run-up to the 2010 General Election, there have been a number of policy 
statements by the main political parties demonstrating a remarkable degree of consensus that the social 
investment approach is needed to complement grant making and public sector spending if we are to 
address social issues effectively. (Social Investment Task Force, 2010, p. 8) 
 Although new programs, such as the Startup Loan program is closer to conventional support 
schemes targeting entrepreneurs in general, other programs have maintained the focus on the 
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poor and unemployed. The New Enterprise Allowance programme, for example, targets those 
already on benefits, encouraging self-employment as a way to get off benefits.  
A perfect example of the consensus is the Big Society Bank. Big Society Bank was the 
culmination of a process that started with the 2004 Commission on Unclaimed Assets. The 
background for the commission was how to best make use of “lost money” locked up in old 
dormant bank accounts no longer in use. In 2007 the Commission recommended the creation 
of the so-called Social Investment Bank (The Commission on Unclaimed Assets, 2007, p. 2), 
and in 2008 a unified Parliament passed the act enabling the creation of the bank.  
As it turned out, the SIB fit right into Cameron’s ideology. With the election victory the bank 
was renamed Big Society Bank and incorporated in the new government’s flagship policy of 
Big Society. Big Society was the Conservative response to “Big Government,” focusing on 
using the state to “help stimulate social action, helping social enterprises to deliver public 
services,” as “the size, scope, and role of the government in the UK has reached a point where 
it is now inhibiting, not advancing, the progressive aims of reducing poverty, fighting 
inequality, and increasing general well-being” (Conservative Party, 2010, p. 37).  
The UK case shows relatively clearly how the problem definition variable influences the 
likelihood of political support for microfinance. When New Labour introduced the NSNR in 
1998 microfinance was seen as a solution to poverty and community deprivation. The election 
of the Coalition government in 2010 saw this definition of the problem shifted in favour of a 
stronger focus of the entrepreneurial potential of CDFIs. Unlike Norway, however, this shift 
in problem definition created a positive impact on support for microfinance. The reason for 
this is that both Labour and the Conservatives also considered microfinance in particular and 
the third sector in general as solutions to a different problem, namely the problem of welfare 
state sustainability. This problem definition ran parallel to the other two “images” of poverty 
and entrepreneurship, and is the main reason we see a consensus among politicians of the 
importance of CDFIs. This consensus has helped safeguard funding over time. 
The Swedish Experience 
The Swedish case is discussed in a similar manner as the Norwegian one, first focusing on the 
government microfinance initiative before turning to the grassroots initiatives. My main 
finding is that in contrast to IN’s initiative, ALMI’s initiative was anchored in an 
76 
 
“entrepreneurial” approach from its introduction. Although its roots can be traced to the 
government’s attempt to address the problem of gender imbalance in business and regional 
policy, microfinance was rather the solution to a problem affecting all entrepreneurs and 
SMEs, namely the lack of capital. While recognising the importance of vulnerable groups, 
such as women and immigrants, the definition of microfinance was not explicitly tied to 
serving these groups. ALMI’s microfinance alternative has therefore been able to maintain 
relevance, ensuring continued political support.   
As in Norway, the roots of microfinance in Sweden can be traced back to the problem of 
equality and entrepreneurship among women living in rural areas. In 1993, a white paper on 
regional development the government was published, arguing that women were 
underrepresented among entrepreneurs. In order to correct the imbalance, the white paper 
among other things proposed a so-called ‘micro grant’ of maximum SEK 20,000, tailored 
explicitly towards “soft investments” and the smaller capital needs of women living rural 
districts (Regeringen, 1994, p. 105). Moreover, the government decided to establish regional 
“Women’s Resource Centres,” tasked with providing business support services for women 
entrepreneurs.  
In 2001 a joint ALMI-SAERG report recommended the expansion of the women’s loan into a 
micro loan with universal applicability (Riksdagen, 2002, p. 22). This recommendation were 
embraced by the government and subsequently incorporated in the already mentioned 2001 
white paper on regional policy. The premise of original woman’s business loan was that this 
group often struggled to gain access to finance. Their lower capital needs and the type of 
business started by this group made them undesirable or unprofitable for conventional banks. 
In the white paper, however, the government stated that while the “difficulties with securing 
small loans have previously been considered mainly a problem for women, immigrants, and 
youth… the demand from ALMI and other actors have been deemed high across the spectrum 
of entrepreneurs and small business owners” (Regeringen, 2001, p. 175). The old target 
groups would remain prioritised, but the new loan would be open to everyone. 
Comparing the 1993 white paper to the 2001 white paper shows a broadening definition of the 
target groups of microfinance. The new micro loan was based on the idea that although 
women might be at a particularly disadvantaged position, the problem was not about female 
entrepreneurship and lack of access to capital in particular, but rather about challenges for 
entrepreneurs in general. In a 2008 report from the Swedish National Auditor quoted ALMI 
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employees stating that they first and foremost evaluated the merit of the business, with 
questions of “equity” as a secondary criterion (Riksrevisionen, 2007, p. 32). In another study, 
an ALMI employee stated that minorities should not be the subject of special treatment, and 
that every loan application should be judged on its own merit (Högberg & Svensson, 2005, p. 
33). This stands in contrast to Norway, where IN as well as the grassroots actors defined 
microfinance as more or less an explicitly women’s measure, but where tensions emerged 
over time as IN moved towards a more “entrepreneurial” approach.14 
This transformation nevertheless did not necessarily hurt the gendered measure that the 
original business loan was intended to address. Numbers from ALMI shows that out of the 
SEK 206 million lent out through microfinance initiative in 2013, 76 million were given to 
women. Similarly 88 million were given to immigrants (ALMI, 2013, p. 15). These numbers 
have been consistent over the last few years, and shows that women and especially 
immigrants are in fact overrepresented relative to their share among the greater population of 
entrepreneurs. It is therefore clear that ALMI has managed expand coverage while 
maintaining its outreach towards women and immigrants as prioritised groups. 
It can even be argued that the transformation instead helped safeguard the women’s focus. A 
2008 report from the Swedish National Auditor criticised many of the existing programs 
explicitly targeting women and immigrants. While the Auditor noted that while these 
programs “have been valuable for those participating in them… they nevertheless had only 
marginally utility for the entrepreneurial activities of the targeted groups as a whole.” 
Moreover, the report noted that, “the supported businesses and projects risk becoming 
dependent on the earmarked money. When the money stops, the project stops” 
(Riksrevisionen, 2007, pp. 8–9). The report concluded that a better way to ensure that the 
goals towards these groups were effective, efforts should be taken in order to increase their 
participation within the state’s ordinary programs. The Auditor’s conclusion echoes the 
statements given on women’s measures by IN as well as several Norwegian evaluations (see 
e.g. Econ Pöyry, 2010; Teigen, 2003). 
Let us now turn to grassroots microfinance initiatives. Whereas ALMIs microfinance 
initiative today is well-established and well-used, the grassroots organisations have struggled 
to survive. Like MFN in Norway, the grassroots microfinance initiatives have adopted the 
                                                
14 As exemplified by the statements given to the Norwegian National Auditor. 
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socially oriented strand of microfinance, and likewise, they have also struggled with attracting 
funds as well as with low interest from the authorities. 
The earliest example of Swedish microfinance is from the project “Nättverksbanken i 
Dalarna,” which ran between 1994 and 1998. The focus was women living in rural regions, 
financed by a combination of local- and EU funds, and modelled on the Norwegian  Lofoten 
initiative (“Nätverksbanken i Dalarna,” 2014). The bulk of the initiatives, however, came 
about considerably later. In 2004 a “Swedish Platform for Microcredit” was started by various 
grassroots organisations, inspired by the United Nation’s decision to make 2005 the 
international microcredit year (“Nyhetsbrev Nr 04 - mars 2005,” 2005). That year a Swedish 
microfinance model was developed as a part of an EU financed pilot project on alternative 
financing solutions for social economy businesses (Herlitz, 2006, p. 33). 
Since 2005, several pilots have been tested across Sweden. The initiatives emerging during 
this second “wave” have explicitly focused on immigrants as the target group, often those 
outside the ordinary labour market. For example, Mikrofinansinstitutet, an MFI born out of 
experience with the PITEM pilots and the first of its kind in Sweden, explicitly targeted 
unemployed immigrants: 85% of participants were to be born outside of Sweden, while 80% 
were to be women (Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet, 2012, p. 126). 
We can also see the same signs of official disinterest as in Norway. In the words of one 
informant:  
The public support for grassroots microfinance initiatives is in principle zero… There is no 
problem in attracting politicians enthusiastic about the idea, but when it comes to actually supplying 
capital for lending there is no interest. (Email GS) 
A key actor in the PITEM I pilot lamented that one of the main problems of introducing 
microfinance to Sweden was that the Swedish government showed no interest in microfinance 
(Högberg & Svensson, 2005, p. 37). A report from PITEM I’s successor PITEM II argued 
that civil servants within the Swedish Public Employment Service15 were unfamiliar with the 
project and its intention. They supposedly showed little sympathy for the microfinance 
approach, and preferred to simply ignore in favour of traditional measures used towards 
unemployed immigrants. The report claimed that in order to achieve any traction with the 
authorities, the project was crucially dependent on sympathetic individuals “within the 
                                                
15 The Swedish equivalent of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration 
79 
 
system” (BalticFem, 2008, p. 15). Finally, a 2004 project not focusing explicitly on 
microfinance but rather on social entrepreneurship, reported that public officials were critical 
to the project, arguing they did not live up to public standards. The officials called for “real 
voluntary work,” rather than social economy actors competing with already well-working 
public services (Eriksson, 2004, p. 12). 
Moreover, the success rates of the various initiatives have been low: a 2011 review of the 
different microfinance initiatives in Sweden shows that out of four surveyed pilots none 
managed to meet original expectations (Altafi, Wennberg, & Borelius, 2011, pp. 28–31). It 
must, however, be noted that although the lack of support has been crippling, the difficulties 
must also be traced to the nature of the pilots themselves. According to the project manager of 
one pilot the main reason for failure was because the participants often lacked basic 
knowledge of Swedish, as well as knowledge of basic accounting and legal issues. These 
ultimately became larger barriers to starting a business than lack of access to capital. The 
amount of training needed to address the shortcomings was simply insurmountable compared 
to the pilot’s limited access to funding (Email GS). In another pilot the microfinance aspect 
was eventually discarded altogether, as the handling bank simply moved its microloan 
customers into its regular portfolio (Email RS).  
Today, no grassroots microfinance initiative exists in Sweden. While the social bank 
Ekobanken advertises microfinance as a part of their portfolio, their micro loan actually 
requires collateral and is therefore not a “true” micro loan. Mikrofinansinstitutet, is also 
supposedly providing micro loans, although it shows no signs of activity, and several attempts 
to contact the MFI have proved unsuccessful.  
Although the Swedish grassroots initiatives do not fit that well within the theoretical 
framework, let us nevertheless draw out some tendencies. The grassroots initiatives are clear 
examples of “social” microfinance. Like in Norway we see that there is little public interest in 
these initiatives. While the government also recognises the problem of immigrants with a 
weak attachment to the labour market, it appears that the authorities believe solutions such as 
microfinance are not appropriate for the target group. It should be noted the empirical material 
to some extent confirms this. Finally, the definition of microfinance as a welfare alternative 
has not gained traction in Sweden like in Norway (and as we will see, the UK). While there is 
certainly a growing understanding of the social economy (see e.g. Palmås, 2008), 
microfinance has so far not been implied in this debate.  
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The impact of decentralisation 
There is also a tendency to tie the target groups of microfinance to geographically delimited 
spaces, such as women in rural districts, or people living in deprived communities. This 
definition of the target groups has opened up for decentralisation of the responsibility for 
funding. As the funding process is removed from central control, microfinance becomes more 
sensitive to changes in the local economy and priorities of local administrators. This has in 
turn has affected the microfinance initiatives negatively 
Let me give a few examples. In 2003, a new public reform, called “Ansvarsreformen” was 
enacted in Norway, decentralising power from the central government to county councils and 
municipalities. For IN this meant that decision making powers and control over the 
microfinance funds was given to county councils, which then collaborated with the local IN 
offices around the country on how to spend those funds (Rambøll Management Consulting, 
2008, p. 38). The idea was that the reform would have a democratising effect: according to 
one of the informants, the policy makers thought that by bringing decision-making power 
closer to those with local knowledge closer to the ground (Interview GN).  
The reform, however, ultimately had a negative effect on the microfinance initiative. First, it 
led to the removal of the earmarking of funds for microfinance. According to the informant at 
IN this is what hurt the microfinance initiative the most (Interview IN 12:50). Moreover, in 
2005 IN removed the designated head office coordinator of microfinance, as the local offices 
took over responsibility for coordinating the local microfinance groups. A 2008 report argued 
that after funding responsibility was delegated to local offices, fewer new network groups 
were created. Low levels of both knowledge of and interest among the local IN offices, 
combined with competition from other programmes, led to microfinance being given less 
priority (Rambøll Management Consulting, 2008, p. 52)  
During the mid-2000s, the UK CDFI sector experienced a similar decentralisation process as 
the one in Norway. When the Phoenix Fund closed down in 2005, responsibility for funding 
CDFIs devolved to the Regional Development Agencies. Unlike the Phoenix Fund, however, 
RDAs were not centrally coordinated, but instead free to pursue their own agendas. This led 
to the adoption of a variety of strategies supporting CDFIs, where some RDAs showed a 
strong commitment to supporting CDFIs, while others showed little interest.  
81 
 
A 2010 evaluation of the CDFI sector shows that although the RDAs were positive to CDFIs, 
the level of funding provided was nevertheless much lower than in the Phoenix era (GHK 
Consulting Ltd, 2010, p. 15). RDAs were also in general more concerned with sustainability 
than the Phoenix Fund. In NEFs 2006 survey of the CDFI sector, several of the practitioners 
called on the government to lift the emphasis on geographical deprivation and instead 
incorporate CDFIs into broader policies for social inclusion (New Economics Foundation, 
2006, p. 28). 
The UK case shows that through decentralisation responsibility is fragmented, and funding 
becomes conditional on the knowledge and priorities of lower-level administrators. Moreover, 
note the two conflicting tendencies shaping CDFIs: on the one hand there is the demand for 
sustainability, which among other things requires scale and focus on the national level. On the 
other hand there is decentralisation and focus on the most deprived communities, which leads 
to a focus on the local level. This dichotomy between what government expects of 
microfinance initiatives and how it enables those initiatives to fulfil them seems to be typical 
of the microfinance initiatives in Norway and the UK. 
Finally, the Swedish case does not reveal the same patterns of decentralisation that have 
occurred in Norway and the UK. ALMI is not bound by any geographical limitations with 
respect to where the loans should be given, and one could make the argument that precisely 
this lack of geographical scope has precluded the possibilities for decentralisation of the 
initiative. The grassroots initiatives, on the other hand, were usually dependent upon local 
funds for their operations. One pilot complained that these local funds came with strict 
requirements concerning their use, thus preventing microfinance initiatives to reach out to 
other markets (Herlitz, 2006, p. 38). 
The impact of EU 
A second tendency concerns the role played by the European Union. We have seen in Chapter 
2 how the EU has been a major advocate of microfinance lending. In Norway and Sweden in 
particular, but also in the UK as well, the EU has also been one of the few sources of funding 
for more social types of microfinance. In Norway, the EU was involved in projects focusing 
on various social issues such as developing a microcredit models to combat urban and rural 
deprivation, integration of third country nationals, as well as the mentioned EIF guarantee to 
MFN and Cultura (see European Commission, 2006, p. 41; Sekkesæter, 2002, p. 6) In Sweden 
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a review of the various grassroots initiatives reveals that four out of six (excluding ALMI) 
initiatives were financed in part by EU funds (Altafi et al., 2011, pp. 28–31). The Full Circle 
Fund, one of the few ‘Grameen-style’ MFIs in the UK also received funds form the EU 
(Examination of Witnesses (Questions 381 - 395), 2000, para. 383). 
One explanation for why the EU appears to be more willing than domestic governments to 
fund socially oriented microfinance initiatives might be because the EU to a greater extent is 
shielded from public opinion. The debate that occurred in Norway in 2008 surrounding IN’s 
supposedly poor use of public funds illustrates the potential backlash in public opinion when 
funding “riskier” projects with a social rather than a more innovative profile. We have already 
seen tendencies of policy makers being more reluctant to try new and experimental treatment 
policies such as microfinance in order to address the problems facing target groups such as 
immigrants. EU on the other hand suffers no such consequences, and can therefore afford to 
fund these politically riskier projects targeted at weaker and less popular groups. The Equal 
programme, under which many of the grassroots initiatives were funded, explicitly targeted 
immigrants, women, and inclusive entrepreneurship. This highlights EU’s historical role as a 
normative power promoting social cohesion throughout Europe. 
Five common definitions 
I now present a table summarising the five main problem definitions that I have identified in 
the analysis. We see that regional policy and gender ethnicity have influenced the 
microfinance initiatives in Norway. Access to capital for SMEs and entrepreneurs has 
underpinned initiatives in Sweden and the UK. Microfinance as a welfare state alternative has 
been influential in the UK, and we see that this is an emerging understanding of microfinance 
in Norway. Finally, poverty and community deprivation have been an important rationale for 
supporting microfinance in the UK. 
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Figure 6.4: Overview over dominant problem definitions 
Summary of the problem definition argument: 
Let me now summarise the main findings from the problem definition argument. The roots of 
the arguments concerning problem definition can be traced back to the two-sided nature of 
microfinance. Microfinance purports to be the solution to several problems, ranging from 
gender discrimination to unemployment to costly public welfare. Whether microfinance is 
successful is therefore dependent on how it is defined, and how that definition fits into public 
policy. 
First, we see that in Norway and Sweden, microfinance can roughly be divided into social and 
entrepreneurial initiatives, where the social type has been a grassroots type of microfinance, 
and the entrepreneurial type have been state run. Governments seem to be more interested in 
funding entrepreneurial forms of microfinance over social, and we see in both Norway and 
Sweden that grassroots initiatives were largely ignored by the authorities. One reason for this 
tendency is that the entrepreneurial initiatives have a more positive image attached to it. The 
Norwegian case illustrated how both public and academic criticisms of IN’s funding priorities 
put pressures on IN to gravitate towards more useful and deserving target groups. It is harder 
for policymakers to justify spending public funds on so-called “rent seeking” activities rather 
than growth oriented and innovative businesses. 
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Second, the analysis shows that the definitions of the problem and target groups shape what 
solutions are considered appropriate. For example, in Norway and Sweden the problem was 
defined as one of gender representation and regional policy, whereas in the UK it was defined 
as one of poverty and community deprivation. I argue that subsequent changes in these 
definitions influence the likelihood of political support for microfinance. Rigid definitions of 
microfinance, combined with changing government priorities can lead to mismatch between 
microfinance governments’ definition of appropriate solutions. IN’s definition of 
microfinance as a measure explicitly targeting women meant that when IN shifted towards a 
greater focus on innovation and growth, microfinance was no longer an appropriate measure. 
This tension eventually led to the demise of the initiative. This stands in contrast to Sweden, 
where a change in ALMI’s focus from women to all entrepreneurs was followed by a change 
in the terms of the loan. This ensured the continued growth of the measure, 
Third, the definition of microfinance as a welfare alternative increases the likelihood of 
political support of microfinance. This definition was part of the rationale when Blair 
introduced the NSNR in 1998 and has underpinned the development of the CDFI sector. The 
argument, in turn, has two implications. First, it explains why there is no “schism” in the UK 
sector as the non-state approach was part of the very reason for the sector’s creation. Not only 
does this lead to a greater range of MFIs, it also meant that there have been no “pet” 
microfinance initiatives for the government to promote at the expense of other initiatives. 
Second, it, explains why the change in problem definition in the UK did not influence 
political support. Although UK too saw a change in problem definition, from a more social 
focus under Blair into a more entrepreneurial under Cameron, there was consensus on the idea 
of microfinance as an alternative to the state, which ensured continued support.  
Whereas microfinance-as-welfare-alternative has been part and parcel of the UK story from 
its beginning, we are only recently seeing signs of this definition emerging in Norway and 
Sweden. The development seems to move somewhat faster in Norway, and MFN have since 
2011 received funding earmarked for social entrepreneurship. While terms such as social 
entrepreneurship and the third sector are still a novelty, recent developments, including the 
election of the Solberg government may see this definition strengthened in the future. This 
will not only increase the likelihood of political support for microfinance, it might also lead to 
a renewed focus on social microfinance. 
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In the last part of the analysis I looked at aspects influencing political support for 
microfinance, although not a part of my framework. It is clear that processes of 
decentralisation tend to weaken political support for microfinance initiatives. As 
responsibility is delegated to lower levels of government, microfinance are faced with actors 
lacking knowledge or interest of microfinance, which is then forced to compete with other, 
sometimes more familiar measures.  
I have also found that the EU often steps in and finance microfinance initiatives that have a 
more social focus. Several of the Norwegian and Swedish grassroots initiatives have been 
enabled by EU funds. The following sections explore the problem definition of microfinance 
and target groups to show how it affects the outcome of the various microfinance initiatives 
undertaken in the three countries. A possible explanation is that the EU is to a greater extent 
shielded from criticism and the public opinion, allowing it to support “riskier” social 
microfinance initiatives.  
It must be noted that I have used Rochefort and Cobb only in the most descriptive sense. 
Rather than focusing on “who’s defining,” I have primarily asked “how is it defined?” There 
are certainly interesting points to be made of the problem definer. For example, it seems like 
Conservative parties are more willing to embrace the microfinance-as-welfare-substitute, 
rather than microfinance as gender policy. This would be in their interest as it fits into their 
ideological perceptions of the state and the role of welfare. Moreover, it seems that leftist 
parties are more likely to define microfinance as a regional or gender policy measure, as it fits 
with their traditional commitment towards these groups. The problem, however, is that there 
are no clear-cut tendencies to draw upon. Entrepreneurial microfinance has also been 
introduced by leftist governments in Sweden, and social microfinance have been encouraged 
by right-wing governments in Norway, exemplified by the so-called Erna money. 
Of course, a consequence of my more descriptive use of problem definition is that the concept 
and its impact is admittedly somewhat elusive. I nevertheless argue that it has proved useful 
as a framework to understand support, or lack of support from policymakers. 
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7 Overall Conclusions  
Why does microfinance emerge in developed countries such as Norway? This was the 
question I asked myself when I chose the topic for my thesis. From this question followed a 
journey through a new and unfamiliar field. A journey that runs from economic theories of 
how microfinance corrects market imperfections in developing countries, to stories of 
Norwegian women coming together to create work for themselves, to theories of how politics 
is formed.  
Microfinance is a subject of large contrasts, not only as in contrasts between the rich and the 
poor world, but also in the way a researcher approaches the topic. One day I have been 
reading about the lack of randomised controlled trials or the influence of policy entrepreneurs 
on agenda-setting. Some weeks later I would find myself at group meetings listening to 
immigrants discuss their one-man import business over tea in a ubiquitous office building in 
the suburbs of Oslo. 
It is this field I have tried to “make sense of.” As the research progressed it became clear to 
me that political, rather than economical explanations are the most important to understand 
why microfinance succeeded or not. This led me to my research question of which factors that 
affect political support for microfinance. Taking a public policy approach, and doing a 
comparative study of Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, I have tried to answer this 
question. Below are my main findings. 
The analysis of the policy window variable reveals that policy windows are important 
determinants of political support of microfinance. If a policy window is present, microfinance 
initiatives are more likely to receive political support. Four distinct policy windows have been 
instrumental in the introduction of microfinance initiatives in the three countries. The policy 
windows, opened by turnovers or the emergence of pressing policy problems allowed 
microfinance to couple with the governments’ decision agendas.  
In Norway, the policy window opened through a combination of a new government and a 
problem of rural depopulation and gender imbalance in regional policy. This enabled 
advocates to promote microfinance as a solution to this problem. In the UK policy windows 
have emerged both during the 1997 and 2010 general elections. In the first case, microfinance 
rode on the back of New Labour’s effort to combat poverty and community deprivation. In 
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2010 microfinance coupled with the new government’s attempt to address the effects of the 
financial crisis combined with its renewed focus on business and entrepreneurship. In 
Sweden, a policy window preceded the transformation of the existing mini loan into a fully-
fledged microloan. The new government’s effort to strengthen measures for small business 
and entrepreneurship, combined with the financial crisis restricting access to credit, created 
the perfect conditions for improving ALMI’s loan. 
The analysis of the problem definition variable reveals that the definitions of the various 
problems and target groups that microfinance is supposed to address influences political 
support for microfinance. Five problem images have shaped political support for microfinance 
in the three cases. In Norway microfinance was introduced on the background of gender and 
regional policy. In addition a potentially new problem definition is emerging, and this might 
lead to more political support for microfinance. In Sweden too gender and regional policy 
were important problems driving the introduction of microfinance. In addition the lack of 
capital to SMEs and entrepreneurs has also been an important problem definition ensuring 
support for microfinance. In the UK microfinance was introduced in the context of growing 
poverty and community deprivation as well as the emerging third sector as an alternative to 
the welfare state. In 2010, the poverty definition was replaced with one emphasising the 
business aspect, renewing the support for the sector. 
Moreover, whereas the early microfinance initiatives were centered around the social variants 
of microfinance, over time policymakers have tended to favour the more entrepreneurial 
forms of microfinance. In the case of Norway, this shift in policymakers’ preferences led to a 
mismatch with the initiative. In the case of Sweden this mismatch was mitigated by 
transforming the definition and structure of the microfinance initiative to accommodate the 
new definition. Finally, in the case of the UK the shift in preferences towards entrepreneurial 
microfinance after the 2010 election represented less of a problem, as the Coalition 
government also supported the definition of microfinance as a welfare alternative. 
7.1 Implications 
Where is microfinance in Europe headed? With the EU committing considerable resources, 
and an increasing number of MFIs approaching sustainability, there are certainly signs that 
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microfinance is here to stay. Self-employment strategies will likely become more important in 
the future, and microfinance might be a key source of capital for those starting on their own.  
There are many more explanations of why microfinance receives public support or not, let 
alone of why some are successful while other are not. Nevertheless, despite all of its flaws my 
study represents one of the first attempts to study microfinance through the lens political 
science, using a public policy approach. Considering its dependence upon the public sector, 
there is little awareness of how microfinance behaves in relation to the state. I therefore hope 
my study can fill a gap and represent a contribution to a broader conceptualisation of the 
microfinance plays in developed countries today. If it can inspire someone to write on the 
topic, and perhaps even improve on the approach presented here, the thesis has fulfilled its 
purpse. 
Moreover, the thesis reveals how important the way microfinance is understood is for both the 
practitioners themselves and for policymakers. I have showed how microfinance initiatives 
sometimes fail just because of misunderstandings between the involved actors of what 
microfinance is supposed to achieve. For example, a recurring theme in all three cases is that 
governments have tended to define microfinance as more of an economic measure, while 
target groups or MFIs promoting microfinance have tended to view it as more of a social 
measure. Microfinance is no panacea, but it would probably work better if everyone involved 
had a little better understanding of the other part. 
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